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1 Introduction
How does unemployment affect an individual’s decision to open a firm and the out-
comes of that firm relative to employment? The answer to this question is crucial
for understanding the determinants of entrepreneurship, firm dynamics and the ap-
propriate policies to promote job creation.
Across the world, countries have established policies to promote entrepreneur-
ship among the unemployed.1 Examples include the expenditure of 37.5 million
euros by France in 2009 alone, with 40% of new businesses being started by the
unemployed (European Commission (2010)). In Germany in 2004, spending on
these policies totalled 2.7 billion euros, representing 17.2% of expenditures in ac-
tive labour market policies (Baumgartner and Caliendo (2007)). In the UK, such
a policy has been responsible for the creation of nearly 2, 000 new businesses per
month since its reintroduction in 2011 (Burn-Callender (2013)). In Canada in 2012,
these policies cost 118 million Canadian dollars, representing 10% of expenditures
in active labour market policies (CEIC (2014)).
Although there is a large literature on entrepreneurship and firm dynamics2, the
labour status of the potential entrepreneur has often been overlooked.3 To analyze
these issues, I propose a general equilibrium model of entrepreneurship that allows
for different choices by the unemployed and the employed. In the framework, the
only difference between the unemployed and wage workers is their outside option.
As a result, the unemployed are less selective on which business projects they im-
plement. In equilibrium, this implies that the unemployed are more likely to start
a firm but, conditional on doing so, hire fewer workers and are more likely to exit
1Policies vary from extended unemployment benefits to direct financial assistance and coaching
in the startup process. Examples of such policies are the Back to Work Enterprise Allowance in
Ireland and the Self-employment assistance program in the US, both of which allow individuals to
keep welfare benefits while they start their own business. A list of policies across Europe, Australia,
Canada and the US as well as coverage in the press are available upon request.
2Lucas Jr (1978), Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), Fonseca et al. (2001), Hurst and Lusardi (2004),
Cagetti et al. (2006), Quadrini (2000), Beaudry et al. (2011), Hamilton (2000) and Haltiwanger et
al. (2013).
3The tradition has been to use models in which differences in outcomes arise due to differences
in innate entrepreneurial ability of individuals. This paper proposes a framework in which differ-
ences in outcomes between unemployed and employed individuals arise in the absence of ex-ante
heterogeneity.
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entrepreneurship relative to an individual who started a business (implemented a
business project) from wage work.
These implications of the model hold in the data. The data being used is com-
posed of the entire universe of tax filers linked to privately owned incorporated firms
in Canada. It improves on employer-employee datasets by linking firms to their cor-
responding owner.4 This makes it fitting for studies of entrepreneurship. I use firm
closures to identify the random assignment of an individual to unemployment (via
lay-offs). I find that unemployment doubles the probability of an individual to start
a firm relative to somebody that remained working and did not lose their job. Next,
I show that among those that entered entrepreneurship, those that entered after a
job displacement hire 26% fewer workers and are 30% more likely to exit from firm
ownership relative to those that entered directly from wage work.
I then consider an extension of the model that adds congestion externalities
in firm hiring to the baseline framework. This allows the job finding rate to be-
come an equilibrium object. This is crucial if we want to understand whether en-
trepreneurship among the unemployed contributes to job creation. Using this model
extension, I evaluate to what extent a policy promoting entrepreneurship among the
unemployed achieves the goal of decreasing the unemployment rate.5 I quantify
the impact on the aggregate economy of a policy that redistributes a share of total
unemployment insurance (UI) income to those that are unemployed and starting a
firm. In my numerical policy counterfactual, 5% of total UI income is redistributed
to new entrepreneurs having entered from unemployment. This corresponds to an
entrepreneur receiving 30% of her previous UI benefits during the first year of busi-
ness. This is similar in magnitude to the subsidy program in British Columbia,
Canada in which entrepreneurs entering from unemployment receive their full UI
4The three most used employer-employee linked datasets, the Longitudinal Employer-Household
Dynamics (LEHD) for the US, the Déclaration annuelle de données socials (DADS) for France
and the Linked Employer-Employee-Data of the IAB (LIAB) for Germany, all lack information on
individual owners of firms. With the exception of registry data from Sweden and Denmark, this is
the first dataset to allow the tracking of all linkages between a firm and its employees and owners
across time.
5The official objective of these policies is to decrease the unemployment rate. Consistent with
this stated objective by policy makers, I focus on their impact on productivity and job creation,
instead of welfare.
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benefits for the first 38 weeks of a business operation.6
The result is a 2.14% drop in average firm productivity and only a 1%7 drop in
the unemployment rate. The policy induces the creation of low productivity firms by
the unemployed. This increases the share of firms created by the unemployed and
decreases the share of firms created by the employed. With a larger mass of firms,
the equilibrium cost of labour increases.8 This induces firms to hire fewer workers.
With higher wages, the value of being a worker increases and the value of being
a business owner decreases for a given productivity level. As a consequence, the
employed become more selective on which business projects to implement which
further increases the share of firms created by the unemployed. Since, on average,
the unemployed create lower productivity firms, average firm productivity drops.
In the quantitative exercise, the employment drop among high productivity firms
offsets job gains from firms created with the subsidy. The result is a shift in re-
sources from high productivity firms created by the employed to low productivity
firms created by the unemployed.
In the theoretical framework, the unemployed and wage workers are ex-ante
identical. In that sense, I investigate the difference between firms created by un-
employed and employed individuals that have the same level of innate ability. Al-
though not the focus of this paper, negative selection into unemployment should
increase the differences in outcomes between unemployed and employed individu-
als. As a result, if negative selection were added to the model, the negative impacts
of the policy would be amplified. It follows that the policy outcomes here can be
thought of as lower bounds.9
6For a period in which the average provincial unemployment rate is up to 8%, the total duration
of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits is a maximum of 40 weeks. This implies that the program
in British Columbia allows individuals to receive virtually the entirety of the UI benefits they were
eligible for in that year.
7this is a 1 percent change not percentage point change.
8This increase in the "cost of labour" comes via a tighter market, that makes it harder to find
workers, and a rise in wages. The model in the next section abstracts from congestion externalities
but they are incorporated in the model used to evaluate policy, with the "cost of labour" for an
entrepreneur being affected by the equilibrium wage as well as the tightness in the market.
9In the model, I abstract from credit constraints. Since workers are more likely to start higher
productivity firms, adding capital and borrowing constraints to the model would imply that, con-
ditional on wealth, workers are more likely to be liquidity constrained relative to the unemployed.
Therefore, it is not obvious why the unemployed would be differentially more liquidity constrained
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Finally, an additional implication of the theory is that higher wages decrease the
entry rate into entrepreneurship of the employed by more than that of the unem-
ployed. Wages represent the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship for the employed
but not for the unemployed. As a result, the employed are more responsive to wage
variation than the unemployed in their decision to open a firm. With an extension
of the theory to a multi-sector environment, I formally derive this additional impli-
cation and the Bartik style instrument (Bartik (1993)) used to test it. Using region-
wage variation and my instrumental variable strategy for wages, I show that a 1%
drop in wages increases the entry rate by 3.2 percentage points for wage workers
and has no impact for unemployed individuals.
While there are papers looking at the empirical relationship between unemploy-
ment and entrepreneurship (see Donovan (2014), Block and Wagner (2010) and
Evans and Leighton (1989)), this is the first paper to evaluate the impact of exoge-
nous variation in unemployment on becoming an employer. Using firm closures, I
isolate the impact of unemployment on individual choice from the negative selec-
tion associated with unemployment. The closest papers to this one are Von Greiff
(2009) and Røed and Skogstrøm (2014), who also use displacement shocks to iden-
tify unexpected transitions to unemployment. However, Von Greiff (2009) and
Røed and Skogstrøm (2014) include self-employed individuals in their measure of
entrepreneurs which for the most part are unincorporated without any employees.
Here, on the other hand, by focusing on privately owned incorporated employers, I
focus on the type of entrepreneurship that impacts job creation. This is an important
and non trivial distinction if we are interested in the effects of entrepreneurship in
the macro economy.
Previous papers have investigated the impact of policies that subsidize entrepreneur-
ship among the unemployed (see Caliendo and Künn (2011), Baumgartner and
Caliendo (2007) and Hombert et al. (2014)), but the interplay between the deci-
sion of the wage worker and the unemployed to open a firm has not been studied
before. Here, I show that these margins are important for the crowding out effects
and more misallocated relative to wage workers when it comes to entrepreneurship. This argument is
consistent with Karaivanov and Yindok (2015) who find that, although "involuntary" entrepreneurs
have lower average wealth, they are less likely to be credit constrained. I leave such an extension
for future work.
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of the policy via a redistribution of resources from firms created by wage workers
towards firms created by the unemployed.
This paper relates to the development literature looking at subsistence entrepreneur-
ship in developing economies. The measure of involuntary entrepreneurship is often
ad-hoc, such as self-employed with no employees (Earle and Sakova (2000)) and
de Mel et al. (2008)) or education (Poschke (2013)). Here, instead of concentrating
on the notion of involuntary entrepreneurship, I focus on the role of involuntary
unemployment for entrepreneurial outcomes. Karaivanov and Yindok (2015) also
evaluate the importance of involuntary unemployment but concentrate on its inter-
play with credit frictions in partial equilibrium. Here, instead, I consider a general
equilibrium framework without credit frictions. Dinlersoz et al. (2016) also have a
model of entry into entrepreneurship by workers and unemployed with credit fric-
tions and labor market frictions. However, they impose an exogenous job finding
rate among the nonemployed. In this paper, while with no credit frictions, in the
model extension, the job finding rate is determined endogenously by the equilibrium
labor market tightness. This seems crucial to evalute the impact on job creation of
promoting entrepreneurship among the unemployed. Finally, while for Dinlersoz et
al. (2016) differences in firm outcomes between the nonemployed and employed are
driven by ex-ante heterogeneity in ability, the model in this paper generates these
without ex-ante heterogeneity.
This paper also links to papers showing that firms started in recessions are
smaller (Sedláček and Sterk (2017) and Moreira (2015)) by providing microeco-
nomic evidence that laid-off individuals create smaller firms.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 develops the baseline
model. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical differences between firms
created by the unemployed and wage workers. Section 4 develops the new addi-
tional testable implication and presents the results in the data. Section 5 devel-
ops the model extension with congestion externalities, explains the parametrization
strategy and reports the policy counterfactual result. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Model
In this section, I propose a theoretical framework to shed light on the interaction
between individual decisions to open a business and the differences in outcomes
between firms created by ex-ante homogeneous individuals and the implications
for the labour market. In particular, the model generates predictions concerning
differences in outcomes between firms created by the unemployed and the em-
ployed (hereafter, wage workers). In equilibrium, due to a higher value of being
employed, W , relative to being unemployed, U , workers are more selective about
which business projects to implement. As a result, despite ex-ante homogeneity
among individuals, ex-post, firms created by the unemployed are different from
those created by wage workers. In the next section I test these implications in the
data. 10 11
The population in the economy is of measure 1. At each instant an individual is
in one of three states : business ownership, unemployed or employed. The economy
can be thought of as being composed of two islands : on one island a Walrasian
market exists, with a unique wage that equates the supply and demand of workers.
Demand is made up by all the jobs created by the individual business owners on
that island. Supply is made up of all individuals on the Walrasian island who do
not operate a firm. A second island is composed of the unemployed, who can
transition to the Walrasian island by becoming a worker at a fixed exogenous rate,
or alternatively, by deciding to operate a business opportunity. 12
Workers can either be forced to move to the unemployment island by an ex-
ogenous shock or decide to operate a business opportunity and become a business
owner. Business owners decide at each instant whether or not they should continue
to operate their firm or transition to the unemployment island. Business oppor-
10An assumption is that there is no market for business opportunities. Wage workers are unable
to trade with unemployed individuals opportunities they do not desire.
11In the model, I abstract from borrowing constraints to keep the intuition clear and concise.
However, in Subsection 3.5 I discuss the interpretation of the empirical findings once we consider
borrowing constraints.
12This version of the model ignores the general equilibrium effects of the entrepreneurship margin
on the rate at which the unemployed can become employed. In the section considering counterfac-
tual policy scenarios, I develop a simple extension of the model that endogenizes this transition
rate.
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tunities arrive at a constant rate ψ, which is the same for both workers and the
unemployed.
2.1 Static Profit Optimization
Let Z be the productivity of the firm, then, define z ≡ log(Z). Conditional on firm
survival, at each instant business owners maximize their profits. Production is given
by y = eznα where n is the number of employees. The static profit maximization
problem for a firm is
π∗(z) ≡ max
n
eznα − wn. (1)
The firm problem above implies







2.2 Dynamic Problem of the Business Owner
Although the profit maximization problem at any point in time is static, the en-
trepreneur faces a dynamic problem, which is whether or not they should continue
to operate. If the firm is shut down, the individual has to pay a cost of χ and be-
comes unemployed with value U .
Once firm production starts, Z follows a geometric Brownian Motion with drift





where Ω(t) is a standard Brownian Motion. Then,
dz(t) = µdt+ σdΩ(t). (4)
It follows that entrepreneurs face the following optimal stopping problem :
rJ(z) = π∗(z) + µJ ′(z) +
σ2
2
J ′′(z) if z ≥ ẑ (5)
8
J(z) = U − χ if z ≤ ẑ (6)
J ′(ẑ) = 0. (7)
Where µ is assumed to be negative, otherwise there would be an accumulation
of firms that never exit the market. ẑ is the productivity threshold chosen by the
entrepreneur below which it is optimal to shut down the firm and exit entrepreneur-
ship.
The cost of shutting down, χ, makes the algebra tractable by guaranteeing that
the expressions for the distributions of both types are of the same functional form,
with the only difference coming from the difference in selection of projects upon
entry, zu versus zw, and the unemployment to employment transition rate, f , versus
the employment to unemployment transition rate, s.
2.3 Problems of the Unemployed and the Wage worker
Once unemployed, an individual receives a flow payment of bw, where b < 1 and
w is the equilibrium wage. At rate f , the unemployed transitions to the Walrasian
island as a wage worker. At exogenous rate ψ a business opportunity is drawn.
Business opportunities are drawn from a distribution F . Let F be exponential of






equilibrium we must haveW > U , otherwise the individual would choose to remain
on the unemployment island and markets would not clear on the Walrasian island.
This is a direct consequence of the assumption that individuals at any moment can
choose not to work.
If the productivity of the potential firm is sufficiently high, the individual makes
the choice to become a business owner and receives J(z). It follows the value
13Note that F is defined over z ≡ log(Z), as such, assuming F is exponential is equivalent to
defining a distribution G from which individuals draw from defined over Z with G being Pareto of
scale 1 and shape β.
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function of the unemployed individual can be written as
rU = bw + f(W − U) + ψ
∫
zu
(J(z)− U)dF (z) (8)
where zu is the threshold productivity above which the unemployed individual de-
cides to implement the business project.14
Once employed, an individual receives flow payment w, the equilibrium wage.
At exogenous rate s, the person transitions onto the unemployment island and re-
ceives value U . At rate ψ, the same as for the unemployed, a business opportunity
is drawn. If the opportunity is sufficiently productive, in other words, if z is high
enough, the wage worker enters business ownership with value J(z). The value
function of the employed can be written as
rW = w + s(U −W ) + ψ
∫
zw
(J(z)−W )dF (z) (9)
where zw is the threshold productivity above which the working individual decides
to implement the business project.15 zu and zw are defined by
J(zu) = U (10)
J(zw) = W. (11)
The rate and distribution from which unemployed and employed workers re-
ceive business opportunities are the same. If they were allowed to be different,
given the closer contact of wage workers with the labour market and currently op-
erating firms, the arrival rate would be higher and the distribution shifted to the right
for the employed. This would only reinforce the predictions of the model that firms
created by employed individuals should last longer and hire more.16
14The event in which the unemployed individual obtains a job and a business opportunity simul-
taneously is measure zero.
15The event in which the worker is placed on the unemployment island and receives an opportu-
nity simultaneously is measure zero.
16This choice of a similar distribution and rate of arrival of business projects is also motivated by
the fact that when taking the model to the data, we explicitly control for the characteristics of the
previous employer of the individual which controls partially for any learning mechanisms.
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2.4 Market Clearing
Let η be the measure of business owners in the population, u the measure of unem-
ployed and n(z, w) the optimal number of employees for a business owner with a
firm of productivity z facing wage w. Then market clearing is determined by
(1− u− η) =
∫
n(z, w)Λ(z)dz. (12)
The equilibrium wage is linked to the average marginal product of labor as this
is in turn linked to the distribution of projects implemented, Λ(z).
In frameworks such as these, where all jobs are being created by firms oper-
ated by individuals of that economy, demand and supply are tightly linked beyond
the price mechanism. Supply and demand are jointly determined by individuals’
choices over which side of the market to operate in. This is due to the fact that
both job creators and workers come from the same pool. It follows that, beyond the
general equilibrium price effect, anything that affects the supply of labor, directly
affects labor demand and vice versa, since they are co-determined by the individ-
ual’s decision to open a business or not.
2.5 Equilibrium Measure of Unemployed Individuals
To close the model, we need the law of motion of the measure of unemployed in
the economy, which is given by
u̇ = s(1− u− η)− fu− ψ(1− F (zu))u+ E (13)
and the law of motion of the measure of firms/business owners,
η̇ = ψ(1− F (zu))u+ ψ(1− F (zw))(1− u− η)− E (14)
where u is the measure of unemployed individuals, η the measure of business own-
ers and E the measure of individuals exiting business ownership. Setting equations
11
13 and 14 to zero and replacing the expression for E in equation 13 gives
u =
(s+ ψ(1− F (zw)))(1− η)
f + s+ ψ(1− F (zw))
. (15)
2.6 Characterizing the Equilibrium






























Unsurprisingly, the value function of the business owner J(z) is increasing in
productivity for the range of values for which the business operates z ∈ [ẑ,∞[. 17
Let Λw(z) denote the measure of business owners operating a business project of
productivity z that were employed when they received the current business oppor-
tunity. Let Λu(z) be the measure of business owners operating a business project
of productivity z that were unemployed at the moment they received the current
business opportunity.18













1−α ) > 0 (19)













Λw(z)dz + u+ e = 1 (22)
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Proposition 2 For all i ∈ {u,w}, the measure of business owners running a firm
of productivity z is given by
• For z ∈ [ẑ, zi]







• For z ∈]zi,∞[

























M i = ψue−βzu if i = u (25)
M i = ψ(1− u− η)e−βzw if i = w. (26)
Corollary 2.1 The measure of business owners, η, and the fraction that were un-
employed when they entered entrepreneurship, η
u
η
, are given by
η =
ψ(1− η)













1 + β(zi − ẑ)
−µβ
] for i ∈ {u,w}. (29)
We are now ready to define a Stationary competitive equilibrium.
Definition 1 A Stationary competitive equilibrium is defined by zu, zw, w, η, ηu,Λu(z),Λw(z), u
such that
where e is the measure of workers.
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• W > U
• J(zw) = W
• J(zu) = U
• J(ẑ) = J(zu)− χ
• The expression for J(z) is given by Proposition 1
• The expression for Λu(z) and Λw(z) are given by Proposition 2
• u is given by
u =
(s+ ψ(1− F (zw)))(1− η)
f + s+ ψ(1− F (zw))
(30)
















The first condition states that the value of being an employed worker is higher
than the value of unemployment. Otherwise, no individual would ever choose to
transition to wage work and markets would not clear. The second and third condi-
tions guarantee that individuals’ decisions to open a business are optimal and the
last condition comes from market clearing.
Now I turn to examining the key proposition arising from the model, which
generates the patterns documented in the data. It states that in equilibrium, wage
workers are more selective about which business opportunities to implement. The
necessary and sufficient condition for it to hold is simply that the income received
while unemployed is lower than that received while employed. Were it not the case,
the equilibrium would not exist as markets would not clear.
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, zw > zu ⇔ b < 1
The following corollaries result from the difference in selection on business
projects between unemployed and wage workers.
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Corollary 3.1 In equilibrium, businesses created by employed workers have a lower
exit rate than those created by unemployed individuals.
Corollary 3.1 results from business owners exiting at the same threshold while
having different levels of selection in the entry into business creation.
Corollary 3.2 In equilibrium, businesses created by employed workers have a higher
firm size and larger profits relative to those created by unemployed individuals.
Corollary 3.2 is a direct consequence of the fact that both profits and firm size
are monotonically increasing in productivity.
Corollary 3.3 In equilibrium, the entry rate into business ownership of unemployed
individuals is higher than that of employed workers.
Finally, as it is often the case with selection mechanisms, an increased average
productivity is associated with a lower entry rate.
The theory predicts that even when we compare ex-ante identical individuals,
we should observe differences in outcomes for entrepreneurs that were unemployed
when they opened their firm versus those that were working. In the next section I
test Corollaries 3.1− 3.3.
3 Empirical Section
3.1 Data and Measurement
The data used for the empirical analysis is the Canadian Employer-Employee Dy-
namics Database (CEEDD). It contains the entire universe of Canadian tax filers,
and privately owned incorporated firms. The dataset links employees to firms and
firms to their corresponding owners across space and time. This is achieved by
linking individual tax information (T1 files, individual tax returns), with linked
employer-employee information (T4 files)19 and firm ownership and structure in-
19According to Canadian law, each employer must file a T4 file for each of her employees. The
equivalent in the US is the W-2, Wage and Tax Statement. In this form, the employer identifies
herself, identifies the employee and reports the labour earnings of the employee.
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formation (T2 files).20 The data is annual and is available from 2001 to 2010. This
constitutes an advantage relative to employer-employee firm population data from
the US, which does not allow the researcher to identify the owners of the firm.
The data is annual with information on all employers and any businesses an
individual owned in a given year. Using this database, I can examine the character-
istics of both the business owner and the firm. I concentrate on firms that contribute
to job creation by hiring employees. This is done by focusing on employers instead
of self-employed individuals.
Business owners are identified as individuals present in the schedule 50 files
from the T2 that have employees. Wage workers are identified as those who are
not entrepreneurs and report a positive employment income on their T4. I use the
information in the T1 files to control for characteristics such as gender, age and
marital status. For more information on the data see the Data Appendix.
The linkage between each firm and its corresponding owner is only available
for privately owned incorporated firms. Incorporated firms have two key charac-
teristics which correspond closely to how economists typically think about firms :
limited liability and separate legal identity. Furthermore, there is a growing litera-
ture showing that incorporated firms tend to be larger and that they are more likely
to contribute to aggregate employment.21 There is also evidence that there is lit-
tle transition from unincorporated to incorporated status.22 These facts, highlight
20T2 forms are the Canadian Corporate Income Tax forms. In the T2 files there is the schedule
50 in which each corporation must list all owners with at least 10% of ownership. This allows me
to link each firm to individual entrepreneurs. The equivalent in the US to the schedule 50 of the T2
form is the schedule G of 1120 form (Corporate Income Tax Form in the US)
21Glover and Short (2010) document that incorporated entrepreneurs operate larger businesses,
accumulate more wealth, and are on average more productive than unincorporated entrepreneurs.
Chandler (1977) and Harris (2000) argue that over time the incorporated business structure was
created with the explicit goal of fostering investment in large, long gestation, innovative and risky
activities.
22Levine and Rubinstein (2017) show that there is little transition from unincorporated to incor-
porated status. They also show that the observed earnings increase for incorporated business owners
does not take place before opening the business, indicating that incorporation is not just a result of
higher earnings, rather, people choose the firm structure based on their planned business activity.
The authors demonstrate how the often cited puzzle, that entrepreneurs earn less than they would
have as salaried workers, is no longer true once we consider incorporated business owners. To-
gether with other patterns of income dynamics and observable characteristics of owners, the authors
highlight how incorporated businesses are closer to firms in traditional macro models.
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how incorporated firms with employees are the most appropriate measure of firms
to consider if we are interested in the interplay between entrepreneurship and the
aggregate economy.23
For the remainder of the paper, the empirical definition of an entrepreneur is an
owner and founder of a privately owned incorporated firm with employees.
3.2 Identification
3.2.1 Exogeneity in the state of Unemployment
To verify differences in firms exclusively due to differences in outside options, we
need to focus on episodes of random assignment of an individual to unemployment.
The question then is how to identify these involuntary transitions to unemployment
in the data. One possibility is to identify those unemployed based on whether they
received any unemployment insurance during the year. However, such an approach
faces endogeneity issues since those who do not expect to be unemployed for long
will not take up the benefits. An alternative would be to consider individuals that
did not work for the entire year, but that would restrict the analysis to individuals
with low labour market attachment.
Instead, I follow an approach inspired in the literature on the effect on employ-
ment and earnings of mass layoffs and plant closures.24 In particular, I identify
laid-off individuals as those that lose their job due to a firm closure. Namely, I
consider individuals who worked for a firm last year that does not exist this year. In
particular, I consider the outcome at year t for individuals that in year t − 1 were
working for a firm that at year t no longer exists (displaced, from hereafter) relative
to outcomes for individuals that at t− 1 worked for a firm that continued to operate
23Another reason to focus on incorporated firms with employees is Canadian corporte law. In
Canada there are significant tax advantages for incorporating as a higher earner. So to exclude
from my analysis high-earning workers that incorporate exclusively due to tax purposes, I focus on
incorporated firms with employees.
24In the seminal papers of Jacobson et al. (1993) and Couch and Placzek (2010), the authors doc-
ument significant drops in earnings for displaced workers. Farber (2017) and Song and von Wachter
(2014) complement these results by further documenting the drop in employment probability after
displacement.
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at year t (employed, from hereafter).25
These displaced individuals are almost certainly involuntarily in that state. Fo-
cusing on the involuntarily out of work is an added benefit. Even if I could see
all the unemployed in the data, I would be worried about using them since some
are people who quit their job in order to begin the steps of opening their firm. For
the remainder of the paper I refer to the individuals, for which their employer shut
down, as displaced/laid off workers and those that did not have their employer shut
down, as employed workers.26
Note that among the individuals that were employed by a firm that still exists
this year, we have both individuals that remained employed since last year as well
as individuals that had spells of unemployment of less than a year. In other words,
the employed workers group is contaminated by individuals that were fired and
had unemployment spells of less than a year. These individuals are likely to be
negatively selected in overall ability relative to displaced individuals. To resolve
this issue, I use within-individual variation when testing the model predictions. This
is done by estimating fixed effects regressions.27
This implies that I will be comparing between moments when the individual
was displaced to moments when the individual remained employed. This is a valid
source of variation if displacement shocks due to firm closure are random over the
life cycle.28 We might be worried that individuals are laid off when they were
already in a downward trend in income.29 To verify this is not a concern, I consider
25Individuals tagged as displaced are those that were displaced at some point between years t− 1
and t. Since I am looking at outcomes at year t this means I am looking at individuals that necessarily
had less than 1 year of unemployment.
26This choice of identifying displaced workers is also a result of having only annual frequency
data. Since I cannot observe spells smaller than 1 year of unemployment, I adopt the strategy of
using firm closures to proxy for individuals that are unemployed for exogenous reasons for less than
1 year.
27Readers interested in the results without fixed effects can refer to section I of the Appendix.
28This is equivalent to the parallel trend restriction for validity of difference in difference estima-
tors.
29This issue would arise if worker-specific productivity is time varying and firms shut down be-
cause many of their workers got hit by a low worker-specific productivity shock.
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a individual fixed effect specification of a distributed lag framework:
ln(yi,t) = γ11{Prev U}i,t−3 + γ21{Prev U}i,t−2 + γ31{Prev U}i,t−1
+ γ41{Prev U}i,t + γ51{Prev U}i,t+2 + γ61{Prev U}i,t+3 + ui + vi,t (32)
where 1{Prev U}i,t+j is a dummy taking value 1 if the individual was displaced at
year t+ j and ln(yi,t) is total taxable income at year t. 30
As is standard in the literature on mass layoffs31, I consider a specification us-
ing individual fixed effects, represented by ui. The use of individual fixed effects
implies the variation being used for identification is within individual. This means
that the coefficients are being identified by individuals that are displaced at least
once in the dataset. The advantage of using within individual variation is that the
effect is well-identified. However, we might wonder how these individuals differ
relative to the overall population. In terms of observables, individuals that are ever
displaced are 6% less likely to be married, on average 2 years younger and earn
20% less income relative to the overall population of 25 to 55 year old men in the
dataset. This is the same variation that I use when looking at differences in entry
rates into entrepreneurship between displaced and non displaced individuals.
These differences are consistent with individuals that are ever displaced being
negatively selected in ability relative to the overall population. It follows that for
external validity, we need the differences in outcomes between displaced and non
displaced to not depend on ability.32
The coefficients on γ5 and γ6 tell us whether future displacement shocks have an
effect on the current value of income. If there are no pre-trend differences between
the moment the individual gets displaced or not we should expect γ5 ≈ 0 and
30I do not consider j = 1 because in the data a displacement shock at t + 1 means the shock
happens somewhere in the interval [t, t + 1]. In particular, if we see a firm in t and that firm is no
longer present at t+1, it is unclear if the firm died at t or at t+1. For that reason we might expect to
see lower t income for the individuals tagged as displaced at t+1, since for certain cases individuals
will have been displaced at t.
31Jacobson et al. (1993), Couch and Placzek (2010), Song and von Wachter (2014) and Farber
(2017).
32Note that this does not preclude ability from having a level effect on outcomes. Instead, we
need that ability does not differentially affect the entry rate into entrepreneurship between displaced
and non displaced individuals.
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γ6 ≈ 0. Finally, coefficients γ1, γ2 and γ3 serve to inform us if the shock has a
persistent effect on income. 33















Notes: Fixed effects regressions to check randommess
of displacement shock.1{Prev U}i,t+j is a dummy tak-
ing value 1 if the individual was displaced at year t + j
and 0 otherwise. The dependant variable, ln(yi,t), is to-
tal taxable income at year t. Only includes men 25 to 54
years old. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
The results in Table 1 indicate that displacement shocks two years in the future
are associated to a 0.9% (γ2 = 0.009) larger present annual income. Similarly,
displacement shocks three years in the future are associated to a 0.8% (γ3 = 0.008)
33The results are robust to including year dummies and controls for age, marital status, province
of residence and characteristics of the previous employer (industry and number of employees). The
result for this alternative specification is available upon request from the author.
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larger present annual income. These differences are small indicating that these
shocks are not associated to particular moments in a person’s life with unusually
high or low income. It is worth noting that significance is likely coming from the
large sample size which makes even such small coefficients significant. As a result,
these numbers are interpreted as precisely estimated zeros. Finally, Table 1 also
tells us that beyond the contemporaneous negative effect on total income, -4.7%,
displacement shocks also leave a lasting effect on income in the following years,
-2.2% one year later, -2% two years later and -1.6% three years later, which is
consistent with the literature on displacement.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Next, I go over summary statistics of the data used in the main regressions. The
firms used in the analysis are on average young (≈ 2 years old). This is due to the
fact that firms used in our analysis must be observable in their first year of operation.
They are also on average small (≈ 6 employees). However, the average hides
variation in firm size as seen by the standard deviation of 19. As is common in firm
datasets, the firm distribution is such that the majority of firms are small but there
are a few extremely large firms that account for most of employment. Now focusing
on the summary statistics for individuals, the two groups of interest (employed
and displaced) have similar average ages (38.48 vs 37.23, respectively). They both
seem to have a tendency to be married (58.13% for the employed versus 50.08%
for the displaced) and work for large employers (employer size of 233.938 for the
employed versus 301.1932 for the displaced). These high employer size averages
indicate that most individuals in the dataset are employed by large firms, despite the
fact that the majority of firms are small. For a detailed table with average, standard
deviation and number of observations for these variables please refer to Section A
of the Appendix.
3.4 Main Empirical Results
In this section I verify that the differences in entry and performance of businesses
created by laid-off versus employed workers are consistent with the predictions of
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the theory. The analysis focuses on men between 25 and 54 years of age. Consistent
with the model, my two measures of performance are firm number of employees
(hereafter, firm size) and the exit rate for entrepreneurs.34
The first outcome of interest is differences in the likelihood of opening a firm
when an individual is laid off (via firm closure) relative to when working. Let di,t
denote the choice of an individual who does not own a firm. This variable takes
value 1 if the individual chooses to open a firm, and 0 otherwise.
Using a fixed-effects linear probability specification, the probability of an indi-
vidual choosing to open a firm is a function of owner demographic characteristics
Xi,t (age group dummies, gender, marital status and province of residence), charac-
teristics of the previous employer, Li,t (industry and number of employees), dum-
mies in the current year, Tt, whether the individual was displaced or not prior to
entering entrepreneurship, 1{Prev U}i,t, and unobserved characteristics ηi :
di,t = β3,1 +Xi,tγ3,1 + Li,tγ3,2 + β3,21{Prev U}i,t + Ttγ3,4 + ηi + νi,t. (33)
β3,2 in the equation above represents the difference in the probability of entering
entrepreneurship for displaced versus working individuals. The prediction of the
model is that β3,2 > 0. Regressions in Table 2 include men 25 to 54 years old
that in the prior year, t− 1, were working for a firm that in the current year, t, was
destroyed (were laid off at some point in between t−1 and t) and individuals that in
t−1 were working for a firm that continued to operate in t (were employed between
t− 1 and t). Table 2 shows that when individuals are displaced (1{Prev U}i,t = 1),
they are 93% more likely to start a firm.35 In particular, the results imply that the
entry probability into firm ownership doubles when an individual is displaced via
firm closure.36 Column 1 shows the results for the baseline specification, Column 2
34This choice of sampling restrictions is made to narrow my focus on individuals with relatively
high labour force attachment. All results in this section are robust to using both men and women
aged 18 to 65 years old.
35These results are consistent with the findings of Evans and Leighton (1989), which state that
the unemployed are more likely to become self-employed.
36The number of observations in the entry regression is not the same as in Table 8 of summary
statistics for individuals, because in the regression I exclude individuals that started a firm by buying
a share in an already existing firm.
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and Column 3 show the results are robust to excluding individuals that in the prior
year were already incorporated without employees and individuals that in the prior
year had some unincorporated self-employment income.
Table 2: Entry Probability
Baseline Robust 1 Robust 2
1{Prev U}i,t 0.0054 0.0054 0.005
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Ratio of probabilities 1.93 1.93 1.93
Baseline Entry Probability 0.0058 0.0058 0.0058
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Exclude if prior year incorporated No Yes No
Exclude if prior year self-emp income> 0 No No Yes
Observations 15,928,932 15,873,979 15,658,403
Notes: Fixed effects regressions of the indicator for entry into firm ownership on the dummy indicating
if the individual was laid off (1{Prev U}i,t). Other controls include age-group dummies, and dummies
for marital status, province of residence, current year, 2-digit industry of prior employer, as well as the
log number of employees working for the previous employer. Includes men aged 25 to 54 years old.
Column 2 excludes individuals that in the last year were already incorporated and Column 3 excludes
individuals that in the prior year had positive self-employment income.
Next, I proceed to looking at the differences in outcomes between the firms cre-
ated upon layoff relative to those created by the employed. To do so, I make use of
the subset of individuals used in the estimation of Table 2 that enter entrepreneur-
ship. Furthermore, due to individual fixed effects, these regressions estimating the
effect of displacement on entrepreneurial outcomes make use of individuals that
had at least two spells of entrepreneurship in the data. Effectively, this means the
sample being used for identification is a selected sample relative to the overall popu-
lation. However, the selection of the sample used for identification is not a concern,
as long as the difference in entrepreneurial outcomes following displacement or
employment is the same between the selected sample and that of the overall popu-
lation. I have verified whether this sample is selected in terms of any observables. I
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found that relative to the overall population of men 25 to 54 year olds, on average,
income is 24% higher and individuals are 14% more likely to be married. Hence,
these look observationally closer to high ability individuals. It follows that if differ-
ences in outcomes between displaced and non displaced does not vary with ability
then external validity is preserved. 37
The first entrepreneurial outcome of interest is the number of employees hired
by firms created by employed workers compared to the number of employees by
firms created by the displaced. The sample used for estimation in this case are all
men 25 to 54 years old that among those used for estimation in Table 2 entered
entrepreneurship.38 In other words, these regressions include business owners that
in the prior year to starting their firm, s − 1, were working for a firm that in the
following year, s, was destroyed (were laid off at some point in between s− 1 and
s) and individuals that in the prior year to starting their firm, s−1, were working for
a firm that continued to operate in the following year, s (were employed between
s − 1 and s). To account for observable characteristics, I control for the business
owner’s age, marital status, industry, province of residence, the year the business
started and a quadratic in the age of the business. To control for the possibility of
learning from the previous employer, I control for the number of employees and the
industry of the previous employer.39
Denote by yi,t the number of employees of a firm owned by individual i in period
t. This variable can be expressed as a function of firm characteristics, observable
characteristics of the owner, including whether the owner was laid off when the firm
was started, and unobservable factors. Consider the following specification :
log(yi,t) = β1,1 +Mi,tγ1,1 +Xi,tγ1,2 +Li,tγ1,3 +β1,21{Prev U}i,s+Ttγ1,4 +ui+ εi,t
(34)
37If we think that the difference in outcomes when displaced versus employed is smaller for high
ability individuals, then the results are a lower bound to the real differences.
38In other words, the control group for this estimation is the subset of the control group in the
entry probability estimation that entered entrepreneurship.
39If firms created by the employed are better than those created by the unemployed, as employees
learn from their previous employer, we should expect a close relationship between firm size and
industry of the previous employer and the size and industry of the current firm of the entrepreneur.
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whereMi,t are characteristics of the firm (firm age, start year and industry), Xi,t is a
matrix containing all observable characteristics of the owner (age group dummies,
gender, marital status and province of residence), Li,t are characteristics of the in-
dividual’s last employer (industry and number of employees), Tt are year dummies,
ui is the set of unobservable individual characteristics affecting firm performance
such as innate ability and 1{Prev U}i,s is a dummy indicating if the individual was
laid off when the business was started. This equation is estimated using a linear
fixed effects regression. β1,2 gives us the estimated difference in number of employ-
ees between firms created by laid-off individuals versus those created by employed
workers. The prediction of the model is that β1,2 < 0.
Table 3: Log number of employees
Baseline Control for local shocks
1{Prev U}i,s -0.257 -0.256
(0.042) (0.042)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Interaction of region year dummies No Yes
Observations 450,502 450,502
Notes: Fixed effects regressions of log number of employees in the firm on a dummy indicating
if the business was started by an individual who was laid off (1{Prev U}i,s). Other controls
include age-group dummies, and dummies for marital status, province of residence, start year
of business, current year, 2-digit industry, 2-digit industry of prior employer, as well as the log
number of employees working for the previous employer. Includes men aged 25 to 54 years old.
Table 3 shows that firms created by individuals when they have been displaced
(1{Prev U}i,s = 1) tend to be around 25% smaller relative to firms created by the
same individuals when they are working. Column 1 shows results for the baseline
specification. One concern is that the results are being driven by aggregate demand
effects. In particular, if a large firm in a small city closed down then this might
drive the entire city to recession. The displaced individuals that start a firm would
exhbit poor business performance due to the low aggregate demand in the city. To
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verify this effect is not driving the results, in Column 2, I control for each economic
region and year pair.40
The second measure of differences in firm performance is business survival.
Let zi,t denote the choice of an entrepreneur which takes value 1 if the individual
chooses to exit firm ownership and 0 otherwise. The sample used for estimation
in this case are all men 25 to 54 years old that among those used for estimation
in Table 2 entered entrepreneurship.41 In other words, these regressions include
business owners that in the prior year to starting their firm, s − 1, were working
for a firm that in the following year, s, was destroyed (were laid off at some point
in between s − 1 and s) and individuals that in the prior year to starting their firm,
s − 1, were working for a firm that continued to operate in the following year, s
(were employed between s− 1 and s).
Using a fixed-effects linear probability framework, the choice of an entrepreneur
to exit entrepreneurship is a function of owner demographic characteristics, Xi,t,
characteristics of the firm, Mi,t, characteristics of the previous employer, Li,t, cur-
rent year, Tt, whether the owner was displaced or not prior to entering entrepreneur-
ship, 1{Prev U}i,s and unobserved characteristics ζi : 42
zi,t = β2,1+Mi,tγ2,1+Xi,tγ2,2+Li,tγ2,3+β2,21{Prev U}i,s+Ttγ2,4+ζi+υi,t. (35)
β2,2 in the equation above represents the difference in the probability of exiting
entrepreneurship for business owners that were displaced by firm closure when they
started their business. The prediction of the model is that β2,2 > 0.
40The results are also robust to including dummies for the interaction between each industry and
year pair.
41In other words, the control group for this estimation is the subset of the control group in the
entry probability estimation that entered entrepreneurship.
42The definition of matrices Xi,t, Mi,t, Li,t and Ti,t are the same as in the previous regression.
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Table 4: Exit Probability
Baseline Control for local shocks
1{Prev U}i,s 0.017 0.017
(0.007) (0.0065)
Baseline Exit Probability 0.055 0.055
Ratio of probabilities 1.3 1.3
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Interaction of region year dummies No Yes
Observations 341,214 341,214
Notes: Fixed effects regressions of the indicator for entrepreneurship exit on a dummy indicat-
ing if current business was started by the individual when laid off (1{Prev U}i,s). Other controls
include age-group dummies, and dummies for marital status, province of residence, start year of
business, current year, 2-digit industry, 2-digit industry of prior employer, as well as the log number
of employees working for the previous employer. Includes men aged 25 to 54 years old.
Table 4 shows that firm ownership spells end sooner when the individual was
displaced when the firm was started (1{Prev U}i,s = 1).43 In particular, it implies
that the exit rate out of entrepreneurship for individuals that were displaced when
they started the business is 30% larger.44 Column 1 shows the results for the baseline
specification. Once more, there is the concern is that the results are being driven by
aggregate demand effects. The closing down of a large firm in a small city might
push many individuals to entrepreneurship. These individuals in turn will perform
poorly due to the low aggregate demand of the city. To verify this effect is not
driving the results, in Column 2, I control for each economic region and year pair.45
43The number of observations is smaller for the regression of the exit of entrepreneurs because in
that case I need at least two lags of the current observation to include it in the regressions. Consider
the example of a firm that exited after its first year. To include the owner i of the firm in year t, we
must see her for the current period t, the period prior, t − 1, to determine she was an entrepreneur
before and the period before that, t − 2, to see if she started her business after involuntary loss of
work or not. For the firm size regression, on the other hand, all that is required is to observe the
individual in the current period t and in the previous period, t − 1, to see if the firm was started
following an episode of firm closure.
4430% just comes from 0.017/0.055.
45The results are also robust to including dummies for the interaction between each industry and
year pair.
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and column 2 shows the results when we add controls for each pair of economic
region and year to control for aggregate shocks at the local labor market level.
The patterns documented in the data are consistent with the predictions of the
model in the previous section :
• when laid off, conditional on opening a firm, an individual hires 25.7% fewer
workers relative to when opening a firm while employed
• when laid off, conditional on opening a firm, an individual is 30% more likely
to exit firm ownership, relative to when opening a firm while employed
• being laid off doubles the probability of opening a firm for an individual.
3.5 Alternative mechanisms
The theoretical model is purposely tractable to keep the intuition clear and concise.
However, there are other economic mechanisms affecting entrepreneurship in real
life not present in the model. In this subsection, I discuss how the empirical results
can be interpreted once I consider these additional economic mechanisms.
One alternative story for the empirical findings is that, if firms created after a
lay-off tend to be the first firms an individual creates, the results might be capturing
learning-by-doing. In particular, individuals might be learning how to be an en-
trepreneur when they start a firm after a lay-off, subsequently, upon entering from
employment they create more productive firms. In Section C of the Appendix, I
show that the differences in size and exit rate persist once I control for an individ-
ual’s total years in the sample as a business owner before the current entrepreneur
spell.46 These results are evidence that learning-by-doing cannot explain the differ-
ences in firms created by an individual when laid off, relative to when working for
somebody else.47
Another alternative mechanism to consider are borrowing constraints. One pos-
sibility is that borrowing constraints are present primarly at the extensive margin.
46The exact controls I use are discussed in the Appendix.
47This is not to say that learning-by-doing does not play a role in a firm’s outcomes. This only
highlights that it cannot explain the differences in firms created by individuals after a lay-off versus
while working for somebody else.
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In the absence of any other mechanism, if the unemployed are more likely to suffer
from these constraints, we expect the unemployed to be less likely to start firms
relative to wage workers. Since what is present in the data is exactly the opposite,
the difference in entry rates estimated in the empirical section can be interpreted as
a lower bound to the true difference.
Alternatively, borrowing constraints could matter most at the intensive margin.
In particular, they might restrict the entrepreneur from achieving their optimal firm
size. In this case, due to lower wealth, conditional on a productivity level z, unem-
ployed would be more liquidity constrained than a worker. However, since workers
are more likely to start high productivity firms, unconditional on z, but conditional
on wealth, workers would be more liquidity constrained relative to the unemployed.
The intuition is that, since workers choose higher z on average, they would have a
larger demand for capital relative to the unemployed. Therefore, it is not obvious
why the unemployed would be differentially more liquidity constrained relative to
wage workers when it comes to entrepreneurship. This argument is consistent with
Karaivanov and Yindok (2015) who find that, although "involuntary" entrepreneurs
have lower average wealth, they are less likely to be credit constrained.48 These
findings are consistent with workers being more liquidity constrained, which im-
plies the estimated differences in firm size and exit are lower bounds to their true
values.
4 Additional Model Implication
In this section I present an additional implication of my theoretical model. It is for-
mally derived from an extension of the baseline model to a multi-sector economy.49
Details of this extension are provided in the Appendix. This implication is closely
linked to the differential selection between unemployed and wage workers.
48The authors define "involuntary" entrepreneurs as those entering when not having access to the
labor market, very similar to the the idea of entering from unemployment.
49This additional testable implication can also be derived using the baseline model without mul-
tiple sectors and is available upon request from the author. The main added value of the multiple
sector framework is to derive a valid instrument for wages to test the prediction.
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Proposition 4 An increase in the wage decreases the entry rate into entrepreneur-
ship among the wage workers by more than that of the unemployed.50
To understand the different channels through which wages affect the selection
into entrepreneurship, let us consider two economies, one with larger wages rela-
tive to the other. A higher economy-wide wage w increases the cost of hiring other
workers, decreasing the incentives to open a firm for both working and laid off-
individuals. This translates into higher selection among both laid-off and working
individuals. But for a worker, a higher wage also represents a higher opportunity
cost of entrepreneurship.51 As a result, the worker’s response to the higher wage is
larger than that of a laid-off individual. This differential selection response trans-
lates into a differential in entry rate responses to wage changes.
In the Appendix, I show that from the model extension with multiple sectors I
can derive the following expression for the entry rate into entrepreneurship in an
economy c for wage workers w and the unemployed u.
Corollary 4.1 The average entry rate for wage workers in an economy c, ERc,w
and that of unemployed individuals ERc,u can be expressed as
ERc,w = β0,w + β1,wlog(wc) + υc,w for wage workers (36)
ERc,u = β0,u + β1,ulog(wc) + υc,u for unemployed individuals (37)
Combining both into one specification gives
ERc,n,t = α0 + β1log(wc,t) + β21{Prev U}c,t,nlog(wc,t) + α21{Prev U}c,t,n + µc,t
(38)
where n = 1 if the individual is laid off and n = 0 if working and 1{Prev U}c,t,n is
an indicator for n = 1 or n = 0. I have added the time subscripts since the data is
over different years. The prediction of the theory is that β1 < 0 and β2 > 0.
50See Section D of Appendix for proof of Proposition.
51This effect of the wage is also present for the unemployed due to the non-zero probability of
transitioning to wage work. But this effect for the unemployed is discounted and so, is weaker.
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4.1 Identification
For my identification strategy, I use variation across different local labour markets
within the national economy. Individuals belong to a local labour market based on
their economic regions of residence.52 The strategy is to then verify if the entry
rate into entrepreneurship in a particular region c, in year t responds differently to
wages for unemployed versus employed individuals.53
In practice, there might be reasons to believe that certain regions have a more pro-
business attitude across all years. As a result, the entry rate in these regions should
be higher for all years, pushing up labour demand and raising wages. This region
specific time-invariant component would create a positive correlation between the
entry rate and wages. To address this concern I include region dummies, 1{c}.
Similarly, there might be years in which the Canadian economy was doing well and
entry into entrepreneurship was high, pushing wages higher, which would again
bias our results. To address these concerns I include year dummies, 1{t}. And
finally, there might be years in which, due to government policy, it was particularly
more advantageous to start a firm as a worker than as a laid-off individual. This
would bias the difference in responses between the two groups to a similar wage
movement. To control for that variation, I include year dummies interacted with
the dummy 1{Prev U}c,t,n, indicating whether or not referring to laid off or wage
workers. My final specification is
ERc,t,n = ξ0 + ξ1log(wc,t) + ξ2log(wc,t)1{Prev U}c,t,n
+ ξ31{Prev U}i,t + 1{c}ξ4 + 1{t}ξ5 + 1{t} · 1{Prev U}c,t,nξ6 + εc,t,n (39)
where 1{c} are dummies for regions and 1{t} are dummies for years. The theory
predicts that ξ1 < 0 and ξ2 > 0.
Using the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem, we know that the estimates of ξ1 and
52Economic regions in Canada correspond closely to commuting zones in the US : there are 76 in
total.
53Cells for which the number of displaced or employed workers of privately incorporated firms in
a given economic region year pair is smaller than 20 observations are excluded from the analysis.
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ξ2 are the same as those obtained from the specification
ÊRc,t,n = ξ0 + ξ1 ̂log(wc,t) + ξ2 ̂log(wc,t)1{Prev U}c,t,n + nuc,t (40)
where x̂ = x− (ξ̂31{Prev U}c,t,n +1{Prev U}c,t,n ·1{t}ξ̂4 +1{c}ξ̂5 +1{t}ξ̂6) and
(ξ̂3,ξ̂4, ξ̂5,ξ̂6) are obtained by regressing x on 1{Prev U}c,t,n, 1{Prev U}c,t,n · 1{t},
1{c} and 1{t}. For region level wages, it amounts to correcting for region and year
specific averages :







This result highlights how identification comes from comparing wage growth across
regions.
4.2 Exogeneity
Despite the use of these additional dummies in regions and years to clean up the
variation being used, there is still reason to expect that OLS estimates are biased.
This is due to the presence of region-year specific demand shocks in the error term.
We expect an OLS specification to be biased by a positive relationship between
wages and the entry rate into entrepreneurship.54
To address this problem, I use an instrumental variable strategy that exploits the
variation in wages due to differences in industrial composition across cities. The
instrument I use was first proposed by Beaudry et al. (2012).55 In particular, the







where i stands for industry, κc,i,1 is the first sample year employment share of in-
dustry i in region c and log(wNi,t) is the wage for industry i at the national level at
54Demand shocks are understood here as any shocks that induce more job creation by firms. One
example is a TFP shock.
55The authors derive the instrument from a model in which industry spillovers arise via Nash
bargaining over wages.
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year t. This term is correlated to wc,t due to across city variation in industrial com-
position.56 The intuition is that regions with a higher concentration of high-paying
industries in the past have larger region-wide wages.57
The instrument relies on the traditional assumptions used for Bartik instruments.
It requires region-wide demand shocks to be uncorrelated with the industrial com-
position of the region in the first year of the sample.58 One concern is allowing
for mobility of individuals across regions. Section E of the Appendix shows how
allowing for imperfect mobility across regions does not change our empirical spec-
ification.
4.3 Results
Column 1 of Table 5 indicates that when we ignore endogeneity, we get a positive
relationship between wages and the entry rate for both employed (0.002) and laid-
off individuals (0.002 + 0.016) as predicted by the theory. This is consistent with
the intuition that the endogeneity is being caused by demand shocks. Looking at
the IV results in column 2 of Table 5, we see that the positive relationship between
wages and the entry rate into entrepreneurship goes from positive to negative for the
employed (0.002 to -0.032) and from positive to zero for the unemployed (0.018
to -0.032 + 0.032). The results in column 2 indicate that the entry rate into en-
trepreneurship of wage workers is more responsive to wages (3.2 percentage points
increase for a 1% increase in wages) than the entry rate into entrepreneurship of the
unemployed (no impact of wages). This differential is due to the role of wages as
an opportunity cost to entrepreneurship for wage workers. Finally, note that the first
stage is strong as indicated by the F-statistic in column 2, row 6.
56Variation in the vector of κc,i,1.
57See Section F of the Appendix for full details on how this instrument and the main explanatory
variable of interest, wc,t, are constructed in the data.
58See Section D of Appendix for formal conditions on the model structure to guarantee validity
of the instrument.
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log(wc,t) · 1{Prev U}c,t,n 0.016 0.032
(0.0044) (0.005)
City Dummies Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Year Dummies X 1{Prev U}c,t,n Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F Statistic 100.92
Observations 1357 1357
Notes: Linear regression with ERc,n,t, the entry rate into firm ownership,
as dependent variable. The main explanatory variables are log(wc,t), log
of wages at the city c and year t level, and log(wc,t) · 1{Prev U}c,t,n, the
interaction between log(wc,t) and 1{Prev U}c,t,n, an indicator taking value
1 if referring to the laid off and 0 if referring to employed individuals.
5 Policy Counterfactuals
In this section I evaluate the impact on job creation of a policy that promotes en-
trepreneurship among the unemployed. This is done by transferring a share of total
unemployment insurance income in the economy to unemployed individuals that
start businesses.
The theoretical framework does not model explicit frictions that rationalize poli-
cies promoting entrepreneurship. One way of generating welfare gains from these
policies is to introduce liquidity constraints associated with startup costs. Such an
addition would limit the tractability of the model, without adding to the main mes-
sage of the paper, that policies subsidizing the unemployed affect the allocation of
resources across firms. For this reason, I leave such an extension for future work
and take as given that governments implement these policies. I focus on the im-
pact that these policies have on the selection margins of the unemployed and wage
worker as well as the resulting effect on the firm productivity distribution and on
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job creation.
Until now, the model has disregarded the general equilibrium effects of the en-
trepreneurship margin on the job finding rate, which has been assumed exogenous
and equal to f . Yet, to understand the impact of a policy on the unemployment
rate, it is crucial to allow the job finding rate to be an equilibrium object. For this
reason, I propose a simple extension of the benchmark model presented in Section
2 which allows for the entrepreneurship margin to affect the job finding probabil-
ity via general equilibrium. This is done by adding congestion externalities to the
model.
A tractable way to do that is to assume that firms managed by an entrepreneur
do not directly hire labour. Instead, they buy an intermediate good y. This inter-
mediate good is produced with labour in a one-to-one fashion.59 The entrepreneur
takes the price of the intermediate good ρ as given and proceeds as before, deciding
how many intermediate goods to use (static problem) and when to stop producing
(dynamic problem). The only difference is that entrepreneurs, instead of hiring
labour directly, buy intermediate goods y from intermediate goods producers that
face search frictions.60
I assume the existence of a large set of intermediate goods producers, each of
which can decide to post a vacancy at any point in time.61 The flow cost of posting
a vacancy for intermediate goods producers is a fraction c of the equilibrium wage
w. When an intermediate goods producer finds a worker, it begins production and
obtains a flow return of ρ − w. Job vacancies and unemployed workers match
according to a constant returns to scale matching function given byKvγu1−γ , where
u is the measure of unemployed and v the measure of vacancies. The rate at which
the unemployed find jobs is given by p(θ) where θ ≡ v
u
. The value function of the
59One can think of that as an intermediate sector that must transform workers so they can be
employed by the entrepreneurs. The intermediate good is then just "transformed labour".
60This way of introducing search frictions follows closely Beaudry et al. (2018), who also include
search frictions in a model of entrepreneurship using an intermediate goods sector.
61This means that for the intermediate goods sector, firms do not come from the same pool as
workers, the unemployed and entrepreneurs.
35
unemployed, U , is now defined by
rU = bw + p(θ)(W − U) + ψ
∫
zu
(J(z)− U)dF (z). (43)
Let s be the rate at which matches exogenously break up, then the value function of
the worker, W , is as before. Wages are determined by Nash Bargaining,
φ(W − U) = (1− φ)(F − V ) (44)
where F is the value of a filled vacancy and V of an unfilled vacancy in the inter-
mediate sector. The price of intermediate goods ρ is determined by market clearing




where η is the measure of entrepreneurs, n(z, ρ) the optimal number of intermediate
goods to hire for a firm of productivity z facing price ρ, and Λ(z) is the measure
of firms of productivity z. The full solution of this extension is in Supplemental
Appendix II.
5.1 Parametrization Strategy
I make use of the my full population adminstrative data to choose the model pa-
rameters. I consider an annual frequency. r is set to 4.5%. α, the curvature
of the production function of the entrepreneur, is equal to the aggregate labour
share, and, as such, is set to 2
3
. Remember the matching function is of the form
m(u, v) = Kuγv1−γ . I follow Shimer (2005) in setting γ equal to 0.72. Still fol-
lowing Shimer (2005), I set φ, the Nash Bargaining parameter, equal to γ. The
rate at which workers transition to unemployment s is taken from Hobijn and Şahin
(2009).62 For the cost of posting a vacancy, I note that as in Shimer (2005), the
model allows a normalization. From the free entry condition and the expressions
62The authors estimate the rate at which employed individuals transition to non-work for twenty-
seven OECD countries, including Canada.
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Equation 46 implies that doubling c and multiplying k by a factor of 21−γ divides θ
by half and doubles the rate at which intermediate good firms contact workers, q(θ),
but does not affect the rate at which workers find jobs, p(θ). It follows that we can
normalize θ. I follow Shimer (2005) and choose c so as to normalize θ to 1. Table
12 in section H of the Appendix contains the results for an alternative calibration
in which I follow Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) in setting the cost of posting a
vacancy to 4.5% of the equilibrium wage, c = 0.045. The results are robust to this
alternative calibration. There is a large literature proposing different values for b
and different ways to identify it.64 For the main calibration, I chose a mid-value
between the values proposed by the literature of b = 0.6. To verify the main results
are not sensitive to this choice I consider alternative calibrations where I change the
value of b. In Table 11 of the Appendix I show the results for different replacement
rate values, b.65
For µ and σ, the parameters governing the evolution of productivity of en-
trepreneur owned firms, I use the average growth rate in firm size conditional on
positive growth and the tail parameter of the ergodic size distribution. In Section G
of the Appendix I state and prove the formal theorem relating these moments.
Finally, to make the model consistent with the patterns in the data, I choose β,
the shape parameter of the exogenous distribution individuals draw opportunities
from, F (z), χ, the cost of shutting down and K, the scale parameter of the match-
ing function, to match the differences in the entry rate between the unemployed
63See Supplemental Appendix II for expressions
64See Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), Hall and Milgrom (2008), Costain and Reiter (2008), Pis-
sarides (2009), Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016).
65Changes in b do not alter the main conclusion of the paper. For varying b, the effect of the
subsidy policy on average firm productivity E[z] varies from -0.9% to -3.43%. The effect on the
unemployment rates (in percent change) varies from -0.004% to -2.23%. It follows that all the main
conclusions from the baseline calibrations continue to hold for different b values. Interestingly, the
drop in average firm productivity, E[z] is increasing in the replacement rate, b. The reason is that
for low enough b, almost all unemployed are already entering entrepreneurship. As a result, a policy
to subsidize entry into entrepreneurship has close to no effect on the unemployed if b is small.
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and workers and the differences in size and exit between the firms created by both
groups. In other words, I chose β, χ andK to match the results in Regression Tables
2, 3 and 4.
The calibration delivers a value of χ of 0.268, which represents a cost equivalent
to 6% of average firm revenue. This is consistent with World Bank data (Ease
of Doing Business Statistics) for which the cost of resolving firm insolvency for
Canada is estimated at 7% of the debtor’s estate. Finally, ψ is shown to not matter in
the impact for the policy in the economy. In Table 10 of Section H of the Appendix
I show that the results are robust to changing the values for ψ. In the baseline
calibration I choose ψ = 24, corresponding to an average arrival time for business
projects of 1
2
a month. See Table 14 in the Appendix for a complete list of parameter
and sources/targets used.
5.2 Policy Analysis
In this section I use the quantative version of the model with search frictions and one
of the baseline model to evaluate the impact of a policy that subsidizes entry into
entrepreneurship among the unemployed. The calibration for the baseline model
follows the calibration described for the model extension with the only additional
caveat that the rate at which the unemployed become workers (f ) is set to match the
job finding rate in the model extension and is kept at that same value once I evaluate
the impact of policy.
I consider a policy that takes 5% of total unemployment insurance (UI) income
and redistributes it to any unemployed individual that makes the decision to start a
firm. The entrepreneurship subsidy policy corresponds to entrepreneurs that were
unemployed when starting their firm receiving 30% of their previously received
UI benefits during their first year of business. This is less than, but comparable
in magnitude to, the subsidy program in British Columbia in which entrepreneurs
entering from unemployment remain eligible to their full UI benefits for the first 38
weeks of operating the business.66
66For the year 2016, given an average unemployment rate below 8%, residents of the province
were entitled to a maximum of 40 weeks of employment insurance. This means that an unemployed
that applied to receive the subsidy is entitled as an entrepreneur to virtually the entirety of the benefits
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In Table 6 Column 1 we see that the effect of the policy in the benchmark model
is a drop in average firm productivity , E(z) (-3%)), a small drop in the unemploy-
ment rate (-1%, percent change) and an increase in wages (1.29%). Despite the
relative lack of movement in the unemployment rate, there is an important change
in the composition of firms. This reallocation can be seen with the change in the
number of jobs created by wage workers, (-6.39%), and of jobs in firms started by
the unemployed, (14.49%). The new equilibrium is one in which more resources are
being used by firms created by the unemployed (low productivity) at the expense of
less being used by firms created by wage workers (high productivity). Consistent
with this, the average firm exit rate increases.
The subsidy policy makes entrepreneurship relatively more attractive to the un-
employed. Hence, their level of selectivity decreases, prompting a rise in the mass
of firms in the economy (via more low productivity firms). The increase in low
productivity firms decreases average firm productivity. The rise in the number of
firms increases labour demand which in turns puts upward pressure on wages. The
rise in wages decreases the value of being an entrepreneur and increases the value
of being a wage worker. As a result of these two forces, the wage worker becomes
more selective on which business projects to implement.67 This further increases
the share of firms created by the unemployed.
they were entitled as unemployed in British Columbia, Canada.
67Note that for the wage worker all that has changed in the world with the policy is that wages are
higher. In the new equilibrium with the policy the value of being an entrepreneur is higher for the
unemployed and lower for the wage worker.
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∆ Unemployment Rate (percent change) -1% -1.11%
∆ Wage 1.29% 0.65%
∆ Labor Market Tightness (θ) − 2.35%
∆ Jobs by Firms created by Unemployed 14.49% 7.12%
∆ Jobs by Firms created by Workers -6.39% -7.1%
∆ Average Firm Exit Rate (percent change) 55.42% 36.37%
Notes: Outcome of policies that make a share of total UI benefits income conditional
on the unemployed opening a firm. ∆E[z] is the percentage change in the average firm
productivity, ∆ Jobs by firms created by workers is the percentage change in the measure
of jobs associated to firms created by wage workers, ∆ Unemployment is the percentage
change in the unemployment rate. The policy takes 5% of total unemployment insurance
(UI) income and redistributes it to any unemployed individual that makes the decision to
start a firm. The entrepreneurship subsidy policy corresponds to entrepreneurs that were
unemployed when starting their firm receiving 30% of their previously received UI benefits
during their first year of business.
In Table 6 Column 2 we see that the effect of the policy in the model extension is
almost identical for average firm productivity, E(z) (-2.14%) and unemployment (-
1.11%, percent change). The key difference in the mechanism lies in the response
of wages to the shock and its contribution to the general equilibrium effect, 1.29%
wage increase for the benchmark model versus 0.65% for the model extension.
After the drop in selectivity among the unemployed and the corresponding in-
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crease in the number of firms, the price of intermediate good increases. This
prompts more intermediate good firms to post vacancies, which in turn increases
labour market tightness.
The increase in labour market tightness has a direct and indirect general equi-
librium effect. The direct effect is to increase the job finding rate, making wage
work more attractive relative to entrepreneurship. Together with the increase in the
price of intermediate goods, it increases workers’ selectivity. The indirect effect is
the rise in the worker’s threat point during wage bargaining. As a result, workers
bargain higher wages, further increasing the value of wage work relative to en-
trepreneurship. The indirect effect complements the direct effect further increasing
worker selectivity.
Since wages are determined via Nash Bargaining rather than supply and demand
the responsiveness of wages is smaller in the model extension with search frictions.
But the total effect on aggregates ends up being similar because with search frictions
the model gets one more margin of adjustment, labor market tightness. In contrast,
for the benchmark model, all of the general equilibrium adjustment can only happen
via prices. The implication is a much smaller wage increase in the model with
search frictions.
Note that, despite the increase in job finding rate in the model extension and its
absence in the benchmark, both models deliver a same change in the unemployment
rate. This is achieved by a larger inflow into the pool of unemployed in the model
extension relative to the benchmark model. This happens via a larger increase in the
firm failure rate in the model extension (55.42%) relative to the benchmark model
(36.37%).
Brief discussion and conclusion
I conclude that, in the context of my model, the policy has close to no impact on
the unemployment rate while decreasing average firm productivity and reallocating
resources from high to low productivity firms. The results also highlight the im-
portance of general equilibrium effects. In particular, the channel of these general
equilibrium effects will depend on the labor market structure. Note that, although I
abstract from negative selection into unemployment on worker ability, adding this
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margin would only strengthen the results presented here. 68
Some caveats are in order. The policy experiment is done looking at steady state
outcomes. An interesting question is how the effect of the policy in the economy
changes with the business cycle. Intuitively, it is not obvious whether the effect of
the policy is larger or smaller during recessions. At one hand, during recessions, the
pool of unemployed is higher. This increases the pool of individuals affected by the
policy. At the other hand, during recessions, the unemployed are more desperate
to leave unemployment. This would mean the unemployed are more likely to start
firms, indicating that the selection is already pretty low among them. This decreases
the degree to which entry among the unemployed could response to the policy.
6 Conclusion
I study the differences between firms created by unemployed individuals relative to
otherwise identical employed individuals. I show that these differences are impor-
tant for our understanding of job creation policies that promote entrepreneurship
among the unemployed.
I develop a general equilibrium model of endogenous business ownership. In
this framework, the only difference between unemployed and employed individuals
is their outside option. In equilibrium, due to poorer outside options, the unem-
ployed are more likely to open a firm, but conditional on doing so, generate smaller
firms that shut down sooner. I test these implications using a novel confidential
dataset with the universe of Canadian tax filers. I use firm closures to identify ran-
dom assignments of an individual to unemployment. I find that unemployment in-
duces a doubling of the probability to start a business, and conditional on doing so,
an individual hires 26% fewer workers and is 30% more likely to exit entrepreneur-
ship. Finally, I use the data facts to discipline a numerical version of the model. I
evaluate the impact of a policy that subsidizes entry into entrepreneurship among
the unemployed. The result is a drop in average productivity despite little move-
ment in the unemployment rate. Furthermore, the policy induces the creation of
low productivity firms that crowd out resources from high productivity firms.
68This is conditional on worker and entrepreneurial ability being positively correlated.
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A For Online Publication - Data Appendix
In this section I describe the components of the dataset being used. The construction
of the data was done by Statistics Canada and not by the author.
The dataset is a combination of information from three types of tax forms in
Canada. The first is the T1 form, which is just the individual tax return form.69 From
there, we get demographic information, age and marital status, total annual income
of the individual and total labour earnings of the individual. The second is the T4
form. This is a form that every employer must file for each of its employees.70
These files give us information for each individual the firms for which they worked
for and their labour earnings in that tax year. The final tax files come from the
schedule 50 of the T2 form. According to Canadian law, incorporated firms must list
all owners that have at least 10% ownership. These files allow me to link each firm
to individual entrepreneurs.71 Together these files allow me to link each individual
to a firm they are working on or to a firm they own.
The last step is matching all these incorporated firms to firms present in the
Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program (LEAP) Dataset. This dataset con-
tains the entire universe of firms with employees in Canada, whether incorporated
or not. From this dataset, I get a measure of the number of employees for each firm
(ALU, average labour unit). The matching with the LEAP dataset allows us to con-
struct a time consistent firm identifier that takes into account mergers and splitting
of a same firm in multiple ones.72
Next I present more detailed summary statistics on both the firms and individu-
als used in our estimation. Table 7 gives the summary statistics for firms operated
69The equivalent in the United States is the 1040A form.
70The equivalent in the US is the W-2, Wage and Tax Statement.
71The equivalent in the US to the schedule 50 of the T2 form is the schedule G of 1120 form
(Corporate Income Tax Form in the US). The only difference is that under US law, a corporation
only needs to list owners that own at least 20% of the firm.
72To identify a same firm the LEAP dataset uses a strategy entitled "labour tracking". If a firm A
splits into firm B and firm C but continues to do the exact same business as before, the method marks
firms B and C with the identifier of firm A, since firm B and C together have the same industry and
workforce as A. This is important since for all purposes, nothing has changed except for the official
naming of the company that now are two firms, even though the owners and employees are the same.
For more details see the Statistics Canada website.
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by the entrepreneurs in the data. Each observation is an entrepreneur operating
an incorporated firm with employees in a given period of time. Looking at the first
row, we see that the firms used in our analysis are on average young (≈ 2 years old).
This is due to the fact that firms used in our analysis must be observable in their first
year of operation. Then, looking at the second column, it is clear that the firms used
in the analysis are on average small (≈ 6 employees). However, the average hides
variation in firm size as seen by the standard deviation of 19. As is common in firm
datasets, the firm distribution is such that the majority of firms are small but there
are a few extremely large firms that account for most of employment.
Table 7: Summary Statistics Firms
Mean Std Dev Number obs
Firm Age (in years) 2.0753 1.9777 450, 502
Number of Employees 5.8736 19.4214 450, 502
Notes: Summary statistics for privately owned incorporated firms with employ-
ees for which first year of operation is observable in the sample. Each obser-
vation is an entrepreneur with a firm in a given year. Includes only male en-
trepreneurs between 25 to 54 years of age.
In Table 8, I report summary statistics for individuals that last year worked for
an employer that no longer operates in the current year (laid-off workers) and those
who remain employed (not laid-off). Each observation is an individual in a given
year. The first two rows report statistics for age (38.48 versus 37.23) and marriage
rates (0.58 versus 0.51). In the third row, I report the average size of the last year
employer for these individuals (laid-off, 233 versus not laid-off, 301). The averages
for both groups indicate that most individuals in the dataset are employed by large
firms despite the fact that the majority of firms are small (See Table 7).
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Table 8: Summary Statistics Individuals
Employed Laid off
Mean Std Dev # obs Mean Std Dev # obs
Age 38.48 8.55 15, 651, 346 37.23 8.5074 284, 807
Married 0.5813 0.4933 15, 651, 346 0.5080 0.4999 284, 807
Employer size 233.938 875.8583 15, 651, 346 301.1932 868.9306 284, 807
Notes: Summary statistics for individuals that last year worked for a privately owned incorporated firm
that this year shut down (laid off) and this year did not (not laid off). Includes only men between 25 to 54
years of age. Age is the age of the individual, marital status is a dummy taking value 1 if the individual
is married and 0 otherwise. Employer size is the number of employees of the employer of the individual.
Married is a dummy taking value 1 if individuals are married.
B For Online Publication - Proofs Benchmark Model
For proofs and characterization of model with multiple sectors see Supplemental
Appendix to the paper.
Proof of Proposition 1.
We know that J(z) is equal to U, ∀z ≤ ẑ. We need to find the value of J(z) for
z ≥ ẑ.
Define





Guess that J(z) will be of the form Ce
z
1−α + Ge−az for z ≥ ẑ. Imposing the
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and a defined by (condition to guarantee rG = −µGa+ σ2
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73Choosing the positive root makes sense, or else for parameters values that satisfy |a| > 11−α
lim
z→∞
J(z) = −∞ (54)











It follows that if a < 0 and |a| > 11−α , ∃zo, s.t.: ∀z > zo
∂J(z)
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Proof of Proposition 2.
Solving generic KFE. The solution below is the same for both types of busi-
ness owners (i.e., i = u,w)
Let ẑ be the point at which firms exit and zi the point in which firms enter, with
zi > ẑ. Let Λ(z) denote the endogenous pdf and M the measure of entrants. For
type u (i = u), M is equal to ψue−βzu and for type w (i = w) M is equal to
ψ(1− u− η)e−βzw
Finally, let for [zi,∞[
Λi(z) = Λi2(z) (60)
and for ]ẑ, zi]










































































Λi(z)dz <∞ we get
k21 = 0 (66)






















































































































































































































































1 + β(zi − ẑ)
β
] (82)




ηw = Awψ(1− u− η)e−βzw (84)
which implies
η = Auψue
−βzu + Awψ(1− u− η)e−βzw (85)
Now using u = (s+ψ(1−F (zw)))(1−η)
s+f+ψ(1−F (zw))












s+ f + ψe−βzw + ψ[Au(s+ ψe−βzw)e−βzu + Awfe−βzw ]
(87)
It follows
1− η = s+ f + ψe
−βzw













Au(s+ ψe−βzw)e−βzu + Awfe−βzw
(90)
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Proof of Proposition 3.
In equilibrium W > U , otherwise all wage workers would exit wage work to go
to the unemployment island and markets would not clear in the Walrasian market.
Here I present a formal proof showing that if b < 1⇔ W > U . Note that rW and
rU can be rewritten as
rW = w + f(W − U) + ψ
∫
(max(J(z),W )−W )dF (z) (91)
rU = bw + s(U −W ) + ψ
∫
































< (r + f + s)(W − U) + ψ(W − U)− ψ(W − U)F (zu) (95)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that J(z) < W for zu < z < zw. It
follows that b < 1⇒ W > U .





































Note that J(z) > U for zu < z < zw, which implies W > U ⇒ b < 1. It follows
that b < 1⇔ W > U .
The result that zw > zu then just follows.
Proof of Corollary 3.1.
Note that in steady state the flow of exiting firms of each type is equal to M i.74
Letting ERi denote Exit Rate for type i, we have
(ERi)−1 = [
1 + β(zi − ẑ)
−µβ
] (100)
(ERw)−1 > (ERu)−1 ⇒ ERu > ERw (101)
where the first inequality follows from zw > zu
It follows that in equilibrium the exit rate is higher for firms of type u.
74In steady state, the flow of firms exiting a group has to be equal to the flow entering.
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Proof of Corollary 3.2.
The expression for optimal firm size is given by
































does not depend on M i (104)




























































Using the expressions for Λi1(z) and Λ
i
2(z) note that



























































































(−(2µ(1− α) + σ2))(β(1− α)− 1)
e
zi
1−α > 0 (112)
The positive sign follows from the assumption that −µ > σ2
2(1−α)
Finally, to complete the proof note that
M i
ηi
= (ER)−1 where ER stands for Exit Rate (113)








Then lettingE[n]i denote average size for type i. With abuse of notation let Λi(z, zj)
represent the function Λi(z) replacing zi by zj , similarly for the measure η
i(zj).



































dz = E[n]u (115)




















Now to see the result for profits note that




Proof of Corollary 3.3.
zw > zu ⇒ ψ(1− F (zu)) > ψ(1− F (zw)).
C For Online Publication - Controlling for learning
by doing mechanism
In this section, I show that the differences in size and exit rate between firms cre-
ated by an individual when laid off relative to working for somebody else cannot
be explained by a learning by doing story. In particular, one concern is that these
differences might be driven by individuals first starting a firm when laid off, dur-
ing which they acquire entrepreneurial skills. After that experience, upon entering
during wage work, individuals would generate more productive firms due to their
accumulated experience as an entrepreneur. To show that such mechanism cannot
rationalize the differences in size and exit rate, I rerun the benchmark regressions
with additional controls for the total experience an individual had accumulated as
a business owner upon starting the current firm. The control I use is a quadratic
in total years I observe the individual as an entrepreneur prior to this current firm
spell interacted with dummies for current year. The interaction with years is to con-
trol for the fact that the value of entrepreneurial skills might vary with the business
cycle.
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Table 9: Controlling for learning by doing
Dependant variable Log # employees Dummy for exit
1{Prev U}i,s -0.2894 0.013
(0.0419) (0.0069)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Controls for entrepreneurial experience Yes Yes
Ratio of probabilities Not Applicable 1.24
Baseline Exit Probability 0.055 0.055
Observations 450,502 341,241
Notes: Column (1) reports results for fixed effects regression of log number of employees of cur-
rent business on dummy indicating if the current business was started by the individual when laid off
(1{Prev U}i,s). Column (2) reports results for fixed effect regression of exit dummy (taking value 1 if
individual exits firm ownership and 0 otherwise) on (1{Prev U}i,s). Other controls include dummies
in age groups, marital status, province of residence, year business started, current year, 2 digit NAICS
industry code for current business, 2 digit NAICS industry code for the last employer, log number
of employees for the last employer and total years individuals observed as a business owner prior to
current entrepreneur spell interacted with current year. Only includes men 25 to 54 years old.
D For Online Publication - Model with multiple sec-
tors and testable prediction
D.1 Model description
The baseline theoretical framework is useful in its clarity to understand exactly
how the selection mechanism operates. But in reality an economy is composed
of different sectors each with a different labour productivity and wage. Since for
each sector the opportunity cost of entering entrepreneurship is different, this has
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implications for individual decisions to open a business. Furthermore, the model
with multiple sectors is useful in motivating the instrument I choose when I test the
additional prediction of the theory.
With this in mind I consider a small extension of the previous framework, in
which now there are C economies each with I industries an individual can work
on. What characterizes an industry is the amount of efficiency units a worker is
endowed with. All workers in each economy c have the same endowment of ef-
ficiency units across industries. Entrepreneurs in this scenario choose the optimal
amount of efficiency units to hire and pay a same wage per efficiency unit across
industries. Conditional on transitioning to the working island as a worker, the un-
employed transition to work at industry i at rate Ωi. It follows the problem of the
unemployed individual can be summarized by












c(z)− U c)dF (z) (119)
where wc is the unique equilibrium wage, ζc is an economy-wide efficiency unit for
workers in economy c, bwcζc is the income of the unemployed individual, W ci is
the value of being a worker at industry i at economy c. Note that since the value of
unemploymentU c and the wage per efficiency unitwc are the same across industries
in a same economy c, then, conditional on z, every entrepreneur is indifferent over
which industry to operate in. With this in mind, I consider an equilibrium in which
the transition rate of an entrepreneur to industry i is also given by rate Ωi. The value
function for a worker in industry i ∈ I is given by
rW ci = wcνc,iζc + s(U







c(z)−W ci )dF (z) (120)
where νc,i is the relative amount of efficiency units a worker is endowed for in-
dustry i at economy c and ζc is the economy-wide efficiency unit endowment for
workers in economy c, where E[log(ζ)] ≡
∑




Ωilog(νc,i) = 0. Now define the economy level wage as wc and the average
industry, economy level wage as wc,i ≡ wcνc,i.
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In equilibrium,





As in the previous theoretical framework we get the result of differences in
performance between firms created by employed versus unemployed individuals.75
Proposition 5 In a multi-sector model of endogenous entrepreneurship, firms cre-
ated by employed individuals have on average more employees, higher profits and
lower exit rates. Furthermore, unemployed individuals are more likely to enter
entrepreneurship relative to workers of all industries.







1 log(wc,i) + ξ
w
2 log(wc) + ξ
w







1 log(wc) + ξ
u
4 log(ζc) (123)
where ξu1 > 0, ξ
w
1 > 0 and ξ
w
2 > 0, furthermore, letE[z
c
w,i] be the average threshold












The corollary below formally relates the entry rate into firm ownership of both
wage workers and laid off individuals to region-wide wages.
Corollary 6.1 The average entry rate for wage workers in an economy/region c,
ERc,w and that of unemployed individuals ERc,u can both be expressed as
ERc,w = β0,w + β1,wlog(wc) + υc,w for employed workers (125)
75See Supplemental Appendix I for full characterization of the model with multiple sectors.
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where υw is linear function of log(ζ)
ERc,u = β0,u + β1,ulog(wc) + υc,u for not working individuals (126)
where υu is linear function of log(ζ) and β1,w < β1,u ≤ 0.
Now combining both into one specification we get
ERc,n,t = α0 + β1log(wc,t) + β21{Prev U}c,t,nlog(wc,t) + α21{Prev U}c,t,n + µc,t
(127)
where µc is a function of log(ζc), n = 1 if the individual is involuntarily unem-
ployed and n = 0 if he is working and 1{Prev U}c,t,n is an indicator for whether
the individual was involuntarily unemployed n = 1 or was working n = 0. I have
added the time subscripts since the data is over different time periods. The predic-
tion of the theory is that β1 < 0 and β2 > 0.
The following theorem gives a linearized expression for past industrial compo-
sition as a function of the shocks in the model that will be useful in the discussion












From the discussion on identification we concluded that the level of variation
being used is that of changes across regions. It follows that, using the result of














































In other words, the validity of the instrument is guaranteed as long as
1. ̂log(ζc,t) is uncorrelated with log(ζc,1).
2. The distribution of log(νc,i,1) is uncorrelated with ̂log(ζc,t).
The first requirement is that region-wide comparative advantage in labour effi-
ciency log(ζ) follows a process of the form




νi,j , with νi,t iid. This amounts to having the component of region-
wide comparative advantage that varies across cities and time (σc,t) to be limited in
its serial correlation. It must be that eventually past shocks to σc,t no longer influ-
ence its current value.76 Note that this is a much weaker restriction than imposing
log(σc,t) to be independent across time and even weaker to assuming log(ζc,t) is
independent across time.
Intuitively, the second condition states that for validity of the instrument we
need the first year industry comparative advantage distribution of a region to be
uncorrelated with region-wide demand shocks at the current period. In other words,
the fact that a city had a comparative advantage in a particular industry initially
should not impact later in the future the region-wide demand shock it receives.
D.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5.
76This property is typical but not limited to moving average processes.
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See Proofs of Corollary 11.1, 11.2, 11.3 in Supplemental Appendix I.
Proof of Proposition 6.
I log linearize (zu, zw,i, ẑ, w, wi, ζ, εi) around (log(z
∗), log(z∗), log(z∗), w∗, w∗, log(1), log(1))
for the expressions of the value function of the unemployed individual rU and for
the employed individual rW . Starting by rU














≈ 0⇒ rγ2 ≈ 0 and
a+ θ
a+ β




(r + f)γ1 + α1
+
φu1 log(w)
(r + f)γ1 + α1
+
fγ1





(r + f)γ1 + α1
(134)
Doing the same procedure for rW and rearranging gives
log(zw,i) =
φw0 + α0
(r + s)γ1 + α1
+
φw1 log(wi)
(r + s)γ1 + α1
+
sγ1log(zu)
(r + s)γ1 + α1
+
φw3 log(ζ)
(r + s)γ1 + α1
(135)









(r + s)γ1 + α1
+
sγ1log(zu)
(r + s)γ1 + α1
(136)
77Remember that E[log(νc,i)] ≡
∑
∀i
Ωilog(νc,i) = 0 and
∑
∀i
Ωilog(ζ) = K (constant)
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Now replace this sum back in equation (134) to get
log(zu) =
φu0 + α0
(r + f)γ1 + α1
+
φu1 log(w)





((r + s)γ1 + α1)((r + f)γ1 + α1)
+
fγ1sγ1
((r + s)γ1 + α1)((r + f)γ1 + α1)
log(zu)+
A1fγ1
(r + f)γ1 + α1
+
φu2 log(ζ)
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2 log(ζ) (139)
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w
2 ln(w) + ξ
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1 ⇒ (φw1 − φu1)(rγ1 + sγ1 + α1) + fγ1φw1 − fγ1φw1 > 0 (143)
Passing −fγ1φw1 − φu1(rγ1 + sγ1 + α1) to the other side, dividing both sides by
















1((r + s)γ1 + α1) + fγ1φ
w
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⇒ (ξw1 +ξw2 ) ≡
φw1




1((r + s)γ1 + α1) + fγ1φ
w
1 )
((r + s)γ1 + α1)[((r + f + s)γ1 + α1)(rγ1 + α1)]
>
φu1((r + s)γ1 + α1) + fγ1φ
w
1
((r + f + s)γ1 + α1)(rγ1 + α1)
≡ ξu1 (145)
Proof of Proposition 7.




ψ(1− F (zw,i,c,1)) + s
, ∀i ∈ I. (146)




= Ωi(ψ(1−F (zw,i,c,1)) + s)−1(
∑
j
Ωj(ψ(1−F (zw,j,c,1)) + s)−1)−1
(147)
Now linearize (ψ(1− F (zw,i,c,1)) + s)−1 with respect to log(zw,i,c,1) to get





Now remember that log(zw,i,c,1) can be written as a function of log(wc,1), log(wc,i,1)
and log(ζc,1). Furthermore from market clearing we can linearize both log(wc,1) and









log(zw,j,c,1) by its expression with only log(νi,c,1) and log(ζc,1) we get
κc,i,1 =
Ωi(Γ0 + Γ1log(νc,i,1) + Γ2log(ζc,1))
(
∑




j Ωjlog(νc,i,1) = 0 and
∑
j Ωjlog(ζc,1) = K, ∀t gives the result.
E For Online Publication - Robustness of Testable
Prediction to allow for Worker Mobility
In this Appendix section I discuss the implications of allowing for mobility of un-
employed individuals across local labour markets. Let µ1 represent the rate at which
the unemployed has the opportunity to change local labour market. When doing so
the individual chooses the city (economic region) that gives the highest utility. It


















Note that the term max
c
U c,t is a city invariant time effect. It follows that after
linearizing we get the same expressions for zu and zw as a function of wages w as
in Section D of the Appendix except now with an additional constant for zu. As a
result the empirical specification for testing the model is unchanged.
F For Online Publication - Details on Instrument and
Wage Measure
In this section I describe how I construct my economic region/year wage measure





definition of local labour market is always an economic region, and the industry
category used is always 3 digit NAICS industry classifications. Below let p denote
individual p in the sample.
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For each year t I run the following regression :












γ4,c,y1{region = c ∩ year = y}+ εi,t
where Xp,t are dummies in age, gender, country of birth and 3 digit NAICS












γ̂4,c,y1{region = c ∩ year = y}
Now for constructing the instrument I first estimate the national industry premia
for each industry log(wNi,t). For each year t I run the following regression :












γ5,I,y1{industry = I ∩ year = y}+ εi,t
where Zp,t are dummies in age, gender, country of birth and city.













γ̂5,I,y1{industry = I ∩ year = y}
Finally, the employment share of a particular industry i, in region c, at the first
year of the sample, is calculated as
κc,i,1 =
Total employment in industry i at region c at year 2001
Total employment at region c at year 2001
(151)
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G For Online Publication - Proofs Calibration sec-
tion
In this section I go over the formal theorem that allows me to pin down µ and σ in
the data, where µ and σ are the two parameters governing how the productivity of
an entrepreneur owned firm evolves once the firm start operating.
Proposition 8 Let δ be the shape of the size distribution of the entire population of
firms, then















where λ(.) is the Inverse Mils Ratio.
E[∆log(ni,t)|∆log(ni,t) > 0] and δ are computed using firms of all ages.
Proof of Proposition 8.
Note that the expression for dz(t) can be approximated as
zi,t = zi,t−1 + µ+ σεi,t (152)
with
εi,t ∼ N(0, 1) (153)
Replacing zi,t by its expression with firm size ni,t
















Now let m be E[∆log(ni,t)|∆log(ni,t) > 0] it follows,80

























where λ(.) is the Inverse Mils Ratio.
Now note that for large enough z the distribution of type j, where j ∈ {u,w}
will be given by81













































































































80Note that taking the unconditional expectation and comparing it to the mean in the data would
be wrong since the observed population of firms is a selected group among those that survived, i.e.,
log(n) > log(n(ẑ, w)). On the other hand, note that conditional on log(ni,t−1) being observed,
conditioning on log(ni,t) > log(ni,t−1) is stronger than log(ni,t) > log(n(ẑ, w)). To see this note
that log(ni,t−1) observed means log(ni,t−1) > log(n(ẑ, w)). It follows that once I condition on
positive growth and adjust the expectation accordingly I don’t need to adjust for selection.
81More precisely, for z ≥ max{z1, z2}
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Now summing over all j
n−
(1−α)2µ





































































It follows that for large enough n,Λ(n) decays at speed given by n
2µ(1−α)
σ2 ∀i. It

























where λ(.) is the Inverse Mils Ratio. E[∆log(ni,t)|∆log(ni,t) > 0] and x are esti-
mated in the CEED data.
H For Online Publication - Alternative Parametriza-
tion
In Table 10 I show that the impact of the policy in the aggregate economy is robust
to changing the value of the rate at which individuals receives business projects, ψ.
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Table 10: Policy outcomes
Model Extension - Difference ψ values
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ψ values 6 12 24 36 48






∆E[z] -2.07% -2.10% -2.14% -2.16% -2.18%
∆ Unemployment Rate (% change) -1.10% -1.11% -1.11% -1.11% -1.11%
∆ Wage 0.63% 0.62% 0.61% 0.60% 0.60%
∆ Labor Market Tightness (θ) 2.26% 2.30% 2.35% 2.38% 2.40%
∆ Jobs by Unemployed 7.31% 7.22% 7.12% 7.06% 7.02%
∆ Jobs by Firms created by Workers -7.15% -7.13% -7.10% -7.08% -7.07%
∆ Firm Exit Rate (% change) 34.25% 35.27% 36.38% 37.07% 37.58%
Notes: Outcome of policies that make a share of total UI benefits income conditional on the unemployed
opening a firm. ∆E[z] is the percentage change in the average firm productivity, ∆ Jobs by workers is the
percentage change in the measure of jobs associated to firms created by wage workers, ∆ Jobs by unemployed
is the percentage change in the measure of jobs associated to firms created by the unemployed, ∆ Unemploy-
ment is the percentage change in the unemployment rate. Results are shown for different values of ψ. psi is
the rate at which individuals receive business projects. E[arrival time of projects] is the expected arrival time
of a business project in the economy given the ψ value chosen.
In Table 11 I show that the impact of the policy in the aggregate economy is
robust to changing the value of the replacement for the unemployed, b.
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Table 11: Policy outcomes
Model Extension - Different b values
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b values 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
∆E[z] 0.009% -1.3% -1.69% -2.14% -2.69% -3.43%
∆ Unemp Rate (% change) -0.004% -0.006% -0.008% -1.11% -1.53% -2.23%
∆ Wage 0.003% 0.43% 0.53% 0.61% 0.64% 0.54%
∆ Market Tightness (θ) 0.005% 0.008% 1.39% 2.35% 4.2% 8.56%
∆ Jobs by Unemp 3.06% 4.29% 5.65% 7.12% 8.67% 10.21%
∆ Jobs by Workers -3.25% -4.46% -5.75% -7.1% -8.46% -9.56%
∆ Firm Exit Rate (% change) 12.54% 18.63% 26.31% 36.38% 50.37% 71.93%
Notes: Outcome of policies that make a share of total UI benefits income conditional on the unemployed opening a
firm. ∆E[z] is the percentage change in the average firm productivity, ∆ Jobs by workers is the percentage change
in the measure of jobs associated to firms created by wage workers, ∆ Jobs by Unemp is the percentage change in
the measure of jobs associated to firms created by the unemployed, ∆ Unemp Rate is the percentage change in the
unemployment rate. Results are shown for different values of replacement rate for the unemployed, b.
Next we go over the impact of the counterfactual policies of subsidizing or
taxing unemployed starting a business with an alternative calibration strategy for
the cost of posting a vacancy c. I follow Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) in setting
the cost of posting of a vacancy to 4.5% of the equilibrium wage (c = 0.045). All
other parameters are chosen in the same manner as in the benchmark calibration.
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Table 12: Policy outcomes
Baseline Robustness - c
(1) (2)
UI redistributed to unemployed starting a firm 5% 5%
∆E[z] -2.14% -2.14%
∆ Unemployment Rate (percent change) -1.11% -1.11%
∆ Wage 0.61% 0.61%
∆ Labor Market Tightness (θ) 2.35% 2.35%
∆ Jobs by Firms created by Unemployed 7.12% 7.12%
∆ Jobs by Firms created by Workers -7.1% -7.1%
∆ Average Firm Exit Rate (percent change) 36.38% 36.38%
Notes: Outcome of policies that make a share of total UI benefits income conditional on the
unemployed opening a firm. ∆E[z] is the percentage change in the average firm productivity,
∆ Jobs by firms created by workers is the percentage change in the measure of jobs associated
to firms created by wage workers, ∆ Unemployment is the percentage change in the unem-
ployment rate. First column presents results for baseline calibration. Second column shows
robustness to calibration of the cost of posting a vacancy, c. In particular, I follow Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008) in setting the cost of posting of a vacancy to 4.5% of the equilibrium
wage (c = 0.045). All other parameters are chosen in the same manner as in the benchmark
calibration.
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I For Online Publication - Firms created by Laid off
versus not Laid-off individuals (without Fixed Ef-
fects)
Before proceeding to the results without fixed effects, recall that the baseline group
compared to the displaced individuals are all individuals that were employed in the
previous year by a firm that in the current year continues to exist. This implies
that the group of entrepreneurs tagged as having entered from wage work also in-
cludes individuals that were employed in the prior year to opening a firm and had
an unemployment spell in between the job and the start of a firm. As a result, this
group includes individuals that started a firm after being fired as long as the spell of
unemployment was shorter than a year. Individuals who are fired are likely to be a
negatively selected group of the population. This negative selection becomes par-
ticularly important if individuals fired are more likely to start a firm than individuals
that never lost their job.
The result is that, without fixed effects, we capture some of this negative selec-
tion that offsets the differences between laid off and employed individuals. Consis-
tent with this concern, the results in Column (1) and (2) of Table 13 indicate that
once we do not control for individual fixed effects the differences in firm size be-
tween laid off and not laid-off individuals disappears and the difference in exit rates
decreases and flips sign.
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Table 13: Log number of employees
Dependant variable log # employees Exit dummy
(1) (2)
1{Prev U}i,s 0.012 −0.0064
(0.013) (0.007)
Fixed Effects No No
Baseline Exit Probability 0.055 0.055
Ratio of probabilities Not applicable 0.9
Observations 450,502 341,214
Notes: Column (1) reports results for regression without fixed effects of log number
of employees of the current business on a dummy indicating if the current business
was started by an individual when laid off (1{Prev U}i,s). Column (2) reports re-
sults for regression without fixed effects of dummy for exit (takes value 1 if indi-
vidual exits entrepreneurship and 0 otherwise) on (1{Prev U}i,s). Regression on
Column (2) only includes individuals that last year were running a business. Other
controls include dummies in age groups, marital status, province of residence, year
business started, current year, 2 digit industry code for current business, 2 digit in-
dustry code for the last employer, log number of employees for the last employer.
Only includes men 25 to 54 years old. Without fixed effects, we do not control for
the fact that the group of not laid-off individuals includes individuals that were fired
and are likely to be negatively selected in ability. This negative selection among the
individuals that were fired and started a firm offsets the differences between firms
created by the employed versus laid off individuals. Standard errors are clustered at
the individual level.
J For Online Publication - Parameters table for quan-
titative implementation
The following table lists the whole set of parameters and the proceedures to chose
each parameter value. For details see main body of the paper.
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Table 14: Calibration
Parameter value at annual frequency Source/Target
β 8.32 Entryu/Entryw
µ −0.11 E[∆log(n)|∆log(n) > 0] in data
σ 0.186 Shape of size distribution of all firms in data
r 4.5%
α 2/3 Average aggregate labour share
K 0.4 E[log(nw)]− E[log(nu)]
s 0.214 Hobijn and Şahin (2009)
b 0.6 Replacement rate for unemployed
χ 0.268 Exitu/Exitw
c 0.562 Normalize θ to 1 as in Shimer (2005)
φ 0.72 Shimer (2005)
γ 0.72 Shimer (2005)
ψ 24 Consider robustness to different values
Notes: Table of calibrated parameters with their respective targets or sources. Entryu/Entryw is the
ratio of entry rate into entrepreneurship between the unemployed and wage workers. E[log(nw)] −
E[log(nu)] is the difference in average number of employees between firms created by workers versus
the unemployed. Exitu/Exitw is the ratio of exit rates out of entrepreneurship between entrepreneurs
that were unemployed when they started their business and those that were working when they started
their firm.
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K For Online Publication - Supplemental Appendix
I : Solving for Multi-Industry Economy model.
This section solves for the multi-sector model economy presented in the paper. It
starts by the full characterization of the model. Solving the model then allows
the proof of differential performance between firms created by not working versus
working individuals. (Proposition 5 in Paper)
rU = bwζ + f(
∑
∀j∈I






ΩjJ(z)− U)dF (z) (168)







where νi is the relative efficiency units a worker is endowed for industry i and ζ is an
economy-wide efficiency unit endowment, where E[log(ζ)] ≡
∑
i Ωilog(ζ) = K






Ωilog(νi) = 0 and ν is
time invariant. Now define the economy level wage as w and the average industry
level wage as wi ≡ wνi.
∑
∀j∈I
ΩjJ(zu) = U (170)
∑
∀j∈I
ΩjJ(zw,i) = Wi (171)
Firm static decision :
π∗(z) = max
n
znα − wn (172)
which implies







Once a business starts operating, Z follows a geometric Brownian Motion with
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Where Ω(t) is a standard Brownian Motion. Then it follows
dz(t) = µdt+ σdΩ(t) (175)
It follows entrepreneurs face the following stopping problem
rJ(z) = π∗(z) + µJ ′(z) +
σ2
2
J ′′(z) if z ≥ ẑ (176)
J(z) = U − χ if z ≤ ẑ (177)
J ′(ẑ) = 0 (178)
where χ is a cost of shutting down.
µ is assumed to be negative otherwise there would be an accumulation of firms that
never exit the market. The cost of shutting down g makes the algebra tractable by
guaranteeing the expressions for the distributions of both types will be identical
with the only difference coming from the difference in thresholds zu versus zw,i
and the unemployment to employment transition rate versus the employment to




































Not surprisingly, the value function of the business owner is increasing in pro-
ductivity for the range of values for which the business operates z ∈ [ẑ,∞[. 82
Let Λwi,j(z) denote the measure of individuals operating a firm of productivity z
in industry j, that were workers in industry i else prior to opening the firm and Λui (z)
the measure with productivity z that entered from unemployment into industry i.
Proposition 10 For all d ∈ {u,w}, the measure of business owners of productivity
z will be given by,








































−βzu if d = u (188)
Mdi,j = ψΩjEie
−βzw,i if d = w (189)













1−α ) > 0 (183)









We are now ready to define a Stationary competitive equilibrium
Definition 2 A Stationary competitive equilibrium is defined by a set of zu, zw,i, wi, Ei, ηui , ηwi,j,Λui (z),
Λwi,j(z), u, ∀(i, j) ∈ IxI such that









• J(ẑ) = U − χ, ∀i ∈ I
• The expression for J(z) is given by Proposition 9
• The expression for Λui (z) and Λ
w
i,j(z) are given by Proposition 10
• Ei is given by
Ei =
fΩiu
ψ(1− F (zw,i)) + s
, ∀i ∈ I (190)
• u is given by
u =
1













1 + β(zw,i − ẑ)
−µβ
(193)
• ηuj is given by
ηuj = ψAuΩjue
−βzu (194)



























The first condition states that the value of being a wage worker is higher than the
value of being unemployed. Otherwise, no individual would ever choose to transi-
tion to wage work and markets would not clear. The second and third guarantee that
individuals’ decisions to open a business are optimal and the last just comes from
market clearing.
Next we are ready to go over the main theorem that will subsequently gener-
ate all the patterns that were documented in the data. It states that in equilibrium
wage workers are more selective on which business opportunities to implement.
The necessary and sufficient condition for it is simply that the income received as
unemployed is lower than that received as a worker. Note that were it not the case
the equilibrium would not exist as markets would not clear.
Proposition 11 In equilibrium, zw,i > zu ⇔ b < 1 ∀i ∈ I
The next corollaries are all a result of the difference in selection directly relating
to the patterns documented empirically. The first states that businesses created by
wage workers have a smaller exit rate. This comes from the combination of all busi-
ness owners exiting at a same threshold while having different levels of selection
upon entry between the two types.
Corollary 11.1 In equilibrium businesses created by wage workers have a lower
exit rate than those created by unemployed
The next corollary states that firms created by wage workers have higher profits
and more employees. This is a direct consequence of the fact that both profits and
firm size are monotonically increasing in productivity.83
83The result that fixing aggregates, the number of employees of a firm matches one to one with
productivity is a direct consequence of the absence of frictions in the hiring and firing process of
firms.
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Corollary 11.2 In equilibrium, businesses created by wage workers, on average,
have higher firm size and profits.
Finally, as it is often the case with selection mechanisms an increased average
productivity is associated to a lower entry rate. It follows that in equilibrium the
rate at which wage workers enter will be lower than that of unemployed.
Corollary 11.3 In equilibrium the entry rate into business ownership of the unem-
ployed is higher than that of salary workers.
Proof of Proposition 9.
We know that it is equal to U ∀z ≤ ẑ. We need to find the value of J(z) for
z ≥ ẑ. The proof just follows from the proof in Proposition 1.84
Proof of Proposition 10.
Solving generic KFE. The solution below is the same for both types of busi-
ness owners (i.e., d = u,w). Let j refer to the industry the individual entered and
i the industry the individual came from. Since the income received when unem-
ployed is independent of the individual’s work history, the origin of all unemployed
that become entrepreneurs is always the same.85 With abuse of notation denote
Λdi,j as the measure of firms created by d type where d indicates whether a worker
(d = w) or an unemployed (d = u), that entered into industry j and, if d = w, the
owner came from industry i.
Let ẑ be the point at which firms exit and zd,i the point in which firms enter, with
zd,i > ẑi. Let Λ(z)
d
i,j denote the endogenous pdf and M
d
i,j the measure of entrants.
For type u (d = u), Mdi,j is equal to ψΩjue
−βzu and for type w (d = w) Mdi,j is
equal to ψEiΩje−βzw,i




84Conditional on a wage, the problem for the entrepreneur is exactly as in the model with just one
sector.
85In other words, there is only one type of unemployment an individual can be in. In contrast,
there are many different types of wage work an individual can be in.
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4. Λdi,j,1(ẑi) = 0
Now, to avoid cumbersome notation drop the subscript (i, j).
Then, the proof just follows the same steps as the proof for Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 11.
In equilibrium W i > U otherwise, ∀i ∈ I such U > W i all workers in that
industry would choose unemployment over employment in that industry and that
industry would cease to exist.
Proof of Corollary 11.1.
Note that in steady state the flow of exiting firms of each type is equal to Mdi,j .
86
Letting ERdi denote Exit Rate for type d , where d = {u,w} having entered from
86This comes from the fact that, in steady state, the flow of firms exiting a group has to be equal
to the flow entering.
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industry i if d = w we will have
(ERdi )
−1 = [




−1 > (ERu)−1 ⇒ ERu > ERwi ∀i ∈ I (202)
where the first inequality follows from zw,i > zu ∀i ∈ I
It follows that in the steady state equilibrium the exit rate is higher for firms of type
u.
Proof of Corollary 11.2.
The expression for optimal firm size is given by








It follows average size for type (d, i, j), where d ∈ {u,w}, j the industry the





















Now to avoid heavy notation drop the subscripts (i, j) but remember all of the
proof is done for a particular (i, j) group. Then the rest of the proof just follows the
proof of corollary 3.2.
Proof of Corollary 11.3.
To see that entry is higher for the unemployed, just note that
zw,i > zu ⇒ ψ(1− F (zu)) > ψ(1− F (zw,i)),∀i (205)
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L For Online Publication - Supplemental Appendix
II : Solving for model with search frictions
To get search frictions assume there is an intermediate goods sector which trans-
forms individuals l into labour units y used by entrepreneurs. The intermediate
goods sector has free entry condition (V = 0)
rV = −cw + q(θ)(F − V ) (206)
rF = ρ− w + λ(V − F ) (207)
V = 0 (208)
Wage determined by Nash Bargaining
φ(W − U) = (1− φ)(F − V ) (209)
Problem of the unemployed
rU = bw + p(θ)(W − U) + ψ
∫
zu
(J(z)− U)dF (z) (210)
rW = w + s(U −W ) + ψ
∫
zw
(J(z)−W )dF (z) (211)
Problem of the entrepreneur is as before (Optimal Stopping Problem)
rJ(z) = π∗(z) + µJ ′(z) +
σ2
2
J ′′(z) if z ≥ ẑ (212)
J(z) = U − χ if z ≤ ẑ (213)
J ′(ẑ) = 0 (214)
and optimal quantity n of intermediate good y to purchase solves
π∗(z) ≡ max
n
eznα − ρn (215)
88
where ρ is determined by




Note that total production of intermediate goods is just equal to the measure of
workers (1− u− η) and the demand is the total demand due to entrepreneurs.
To see a relationship between w and ρ use Equations (206), (207) and (208) to get
w =
ρq(θ)
c(r + s) + q(θ)
(217)







(W − U) (218)
Now replace w by its expression
cρ




(W − U) (219)
which pins down θ for a given value of W and U . Finally, ρ is given by market
clearing in the intermediate goods sector




where u is the measure of unemployed, η the measure of entrepreneurs, n(z, ρ) the
optimal amount of transformed labour to hire for a given productivity z and price ρ
and Λ(z) is the distribution of firm productivity.
Solving for optimal profits gives








Replacing ρ by its expression as a function of w and θ we get








The cost of an intermediate goods unit for entrepreneurs is a function of wages








L.1 Characterizing the Equilibrium





























Not surprisingly, the value function of the business owner J(z) is increasing in
productivity for the range of values for which the business operates z ∈ [ẑ,∞[. 87













1−α ) > 0 (228)









Let Λw(z) denote the measure of business owners operating a business project
of productivity z that were employed by somebody else when they received the
current business opportunity and Λu(z) the measure of business owners operating
a business project of productivity z that were not working at the moment they re-
ceived the current business opportunity.88
Proposition 13 For all i ∈ {u,w}, the measure of business owners running a firm
of productivity z is given by,
• For z ∈ [ẑ, zi]







• For z ∈]zi,∞[

























M i = ψue−βzu if i = u (234)
M i = ψ(1− u− η)e−βzw if i = w (235)
Corollary 13.1 The measure of business owners, η, and the fraction that were not
working prior to entering entrepreneurship, η
u
η
, are given by :
η =
ψ(1− η)









Au(s+ ψe−βzw)e−βzu + Awfe−βzw
(237)





Λw(z)dz + u+ e = 1 (231)




1 + β(zi − ẑ)
−µβ
]. (238)
We are now ready to define a Stationary competitive equilibrium
Definition 3 A Stationary competitive equilibrium is defined by zu, zw, ρ, η, ηu,Λu(z),Λw(z), u, θ, w
such that
• W > U
• J(zw) = W
• J(zu) = U
• J(ẑ) = J(zu)− g
• The expression for J(z) is given by Proposition 12
• The expression for Λu(z) and Λw(z) are given by Proposition 13
• u is given by
u =
(s+ ψ(1− F (zw)))(1− η)
p(θ) + s+ ψ(1− F (zw))
(239)


























c(r + s) + q(θ)
(242)
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The first condition states that the value of being a employed worker is higher
than the value of not working. Otherwise, no individual would ever choose to tran-
sition to wage work and markets would not clear. The second and third guarantee
that individuals’ decisions to open a business are optimal and the last three just
come from market clearing in the final good sector, determination of tightness in
the intermediate goods sector and wage determination via Nash Bargaining. Next,
I summarize that the equilibrium can be characterized by a system of 5 equations
and 5 unknowns.
A Stationary equilibrium can be characterized by 5 variables (θ, ρ, ẑ, zu, zw)
and 5 equations
•
rJ(zu) = bw + f(J(zw)− J(zu)) + ψ
∫
zu
(J(z)− J(zu))dF (z) (243)
•
rJ(zw) = w + s(J(zu)− J(zw)) + ψ
∫
zw
(J(z)− J(zw))dF (z) (244)
•























where J(z) is given by Proposition 12 and Λu(z),Λw(z) are given by Proposition
13.
We are ready to go over the main theorem that subsequently generates all the
patterns that were documented in the data. It states that in equilibrium wage workers
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are more selective on which business opportunities to implement. The necessary
and sufficient condition for it is simply that the income received while not working
is lower than that received as a worker. Were it not the case the equilibrium would
not exist as markets would not clear.
Proposition 14 In equilibrium, zw > zu ⇔ b < 1
The next corollaries are all a result of the difference in selection directly relating
to the patterns documented empirically.
Corollary 14.1 In equilibrium, businesses created by employed workers have a
lower exit rate than those created by not working individuals.
Corollary 14.1 is a result of the combination of all business owners exiting at
the same threshold while having different levels of selection upon entry between
the two types.
Corollary 14.2 In equilibrium, businesses created by employed workers, on av-
erage, have higher firm size and profits relative to those created by not working
individuals.
Corollary 14.2 is a direct consequence of the fact that both profits and firm size
are monotonically increasing in productivity.
Corollary 14.3 In equilibrium, the entry rate into business ownership of not work-
ing individuals is higher than that of employed workers.
Finally, as it is often the case with selection mechanisms an increased average
productivity is associated to a lower entry rate.
It follows that this stylized model is capable of capturing the differences in
businesses created by not working individuals versus employed workers in the data.
The next section derives a testable prediction from the theory and tests it in the data.
Proof of Proposition 12.
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We know that it is equal to U ∀z ≤ ẑ. We need to find the value of J(z)
for z ≥ ẑ. As in the benchmark model conditional on a price for the input of the
entrepreneur (w before, and now ρ), the optimal stopping problem is the same. It
follows, the proof just follows from the proof in Proposition 1.89
Proof of Proposition 13.
Solving generic KFE. The solution below is the same for both types of busi-
ness owners (i.e., i = u,w)
Let ẑ be the point at which firms exit and zi the point in which firms enter, with
zi > ẑ. Let Λ(z) denote the endogenous pdf and M the measure of entrants. For
type u (i = u), M is equal to ψue−βzu and for type w (i = w) M is equal to
ψ(1− u− η)e−βzw
Finally, for [zi,∞[
Λi(z) = Λi2(z) (248)
and for ]ẑ, zi]













































89Conditional on a wage, the problem for the entrepreneur is exactly as in the model with just one
sector.
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4. Λi1(ẑ) = 0
The proof then just follows the same steps as the proof for Proposition 2.
Proof of Corollary 13.1.
The steps of this proof just follow the steps of the proof of corollary 2.1.
Proof of Proposition 14.
The only difference between the value functions of U and W in the framework
with search frictions relative to the benchmark model is that the exogenous tran-
sition rate from U to W , f , is replaced by an equilibrium object p(θ). But from
the point of view of the individual making the decision to open a firm or not, the
transition rate from W to U is taken as given.
It follows that for this proof we can just follow the same steps as the proof for
Proposition 3, except that I replace f by p(θ).
Proof of Corollary 14.1.
The proof of this corollary just follows the proof of corollary 3.1.
Proof of Corollary 14.2.
The expression for optimal firm size is given by








The only difference relative to the model without search frictions is that the cost
of one input for the entrepreneur was w and here it is ρ. But other than that the
expression is identical. It follows that the proof of this corollary just follows the
proof of corollary 3.2.
Proof of Corollary 14.3.
zw > zu ⇒ ψ(1− F (zu)) > ψ(1− F (zw)).
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